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Logic, law, and perhaps even life would be neater if the text and
history of the United States Constitution would hold still. Our consti-
tutional past surely would be more usable if we could rely on history
for answers to the kind of binary questions the adversary system tends
to pose. In constitutional law, however, even constitutional truisms
almost never will be true. The farrago of our federalism provides a
prime example of how textual and historical ingredients, added inter-
mittently to appeal to different tastes, have become difficult to pene-
trate and virtually impossible to swallow.
A good place to begin is the fundamental notion that our national
government is confined to powers granted to it by the Constitution. It
* Professor of Law, Boston University. Many people share credit or blame for this article. I first
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to the challenge of being a scholar-in-residence at the University of Colorado School of Law in March,
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is also a truism, however, that the power granted to Congress to spend
for the general welfare extends beyond purposes explicitly mentioned
elsewhere in the constitutional text.' As a practical matter, this was
perceived to be obvious at least from the 1790s, when Congress voted
to subsidize the cod fisheries and when President George Washington
proposed a national university; it generally remained a fact of political
and constitutional life through internal improvements, land grant col-
leges and federal involvement in activities ranging, in the late nine-
teenth century, from aid to agriculture to acquisition of the
Gettysburg battlefield.2 Ironically, the United States Supreme Court
formally endorsed an expansive view of the spending power a half-
century ago in United States v. Butler, which invalidated the New
Deal's Agricultural Adjustment Act on other grounds. The Butler
majority said that to confine the spending power of Congress to pow-
ers otherwise expressly stated in the Constitution would make the
spending power a "mere tautology."3
For a generation after World War II, it was assumed that the
tenth amendment was "but a truism"4 which did not add the weight of
constitutional text to state sovereignty claims. Yet the theory that the
tenth amendment provides a separate constitutional barrier protecting
state sovereignty, a theory invoked to invalidate federal law in Butler,
has recently been resurrected and much debated.
After a brief revival in National League of Cities v. Usery, the
specific claim that the tenth amendment creates an enclave for state
1. The best single source for public proclamations and practices indicating the extent of Congress'
power to spend for the general welfare throughout the nineteenth century is a forgotten article by
Edward Corwin, written to rebut constitutional arguments against the Sheppard-Towner Act ("Mater-
nity Act") of 1921: Corwin, The Spending Power of Congress-Apropos the Maternity Act, 36 HARV. L.
REV. 548 (1923). As far as I have been able to ascertain, this article has not been cited in any judicial
decision for as far back as LEXIS goes. Even the book Corwin wrote on similar themes, E. CORWIN,
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. (1941), is an almost entirely forgotten classic today.
The best contemporary treatment of the history of federalism is in the work of Harry Scheiber.
See, e.g., Scheiber, Federalism and Legal Process: Historical and Contemporary Analysis of the Ameri-
can System, 14 LAW & Socv. REV. 663 (1980); Scheiber, Federalism and the Constitution: The Origi-
nal Understanding, in L. FRIEDMAN & H. SCHEMER, AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
ORDER 85 (1978).
2. The Court unanimously affirmed inherent federal power to purchase the Gettysburg battlefield
in United States v. Gettysburg Electric Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896).
3. 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936).
4. United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). This was not a new concept, of
course, even before the change in the Court in 1937. See, e.g., United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716
(1931)(tenth amendment added nothing to Constitution as originally ratified). The Court began to
suggest that this truism, the tenth amendment, was "not without significance" in United States v. Fry,
421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975) and appeared to rely upon it in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976), discussed infra 801-03. The tenth amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."
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authority once again, but just barely, fails to command a majority of
the Court.5 Now, however, it is also embraced by a surprising number
of otherwise quite sensible commentators.6 With considerable vigor,
these scholars and dissenting Justices prophesy that the tenth amend-
ment will not be interred again for long.7 Those Justices and commen-
tators who bemoan the reburial of the tenth amendment in Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority8 claim that their vision of
states' rights has an unbroken lineage in our constitutional history.
There are precedents to support their position, to be sure, but a close
look at the old chestnuts available to them - such as Texas v. White, 9
5. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (holding application of federal Fair
Labor Standards Acts to state employees unconstitutional for infringing authority of states qua states);
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985) (overruling National
League of Cities).
6. The tenth amendment enclave approach is advanced with considerable passion by distin-
guished scholars today. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH L. REV.
1709 (1985); Howard, Garcia and the Values of Federalism: On the Need for a Recurrence to Funda-
mental Principles, 19 GA. L. REV. 789 (1985); Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 GA. L. REV. 917
(1985); Schwartz, National League of Cities Again - R.LP. or a Ghost that Still Walks?, 54 FORDHAM
L. REV. 141 (1985). But see Martha Field's critical comment: Field, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropoli-
tan Transit Authority: The Demise of a Misguided Doctrine, 99 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1985).
7. Moreover, a majority of the Court, somewhat paradoxically, seems committed to constructing
a broad and thickening wall elsewhere to defend the truisms of Their Federalism. Built in part of
eleventh amendment materials, this anachronistic battlement rests on undefined structural assumptions
which have little to do with our nation's history and almost nothing to do with our constitutional text.
It is particularly difficult to explain Justice White's shifting alliances. He seems to reject the tenth
amendment barrier theory, as he did by joining the majority in Garcia, yet seems quite fond of the
metaconstitutional theories of Our Federalism. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95
(1983); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974). White has also joined the current Court's crusade to
secure an eleventh amendment fortification to protect state sovereignty. This campaign has advanced
to the point that a majority now hints of willingness to launch offensive maneuvers, even unto reconsid-
eration of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,
104 S. Ct. 900, 909, 911, 915 n.25 (1984). But see the devastating critique of that decision in Shapiro,
Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61 (1984).
Justice Powell's majority opinion in Pennhurst H strongly implies disagreement with Charles Alan
Wright's view that Ex parte Young's noble lie is "indispensable to the establishment of constitutional
government and the rule of law." C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 292 (4th ed. 1983). Perhaps
Justice White joined Justice Powell's majority opinion in Pennhurst II to work from within and thereby
to restrain somewhat the zeal of the four Garcia dissenters, who seem little concerned about particular
constitutional grounds but remarkably enthusiastic about expanding states' rights. They appear anx-
ious to recapture some of the of judicial activism on behalf of separation of the spheres associated with
the Gilded Age and to recapitulate the dual federalism approach which lasted through the 1920s. See
generally S. WOOD, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (1968); E. CORWIN, THE
TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT (1934).
8. 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
9. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869). Texas v. White is a favorite citation for its statement: "The
Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States."
Id. at 725. That idea, of course, is hardly controversial. But the context of the case, and its actual
holding, significantly reduces the relevance of that dictum. The litigated question in the case was
whether Texas bonds issued before the Civil War but still in the Texas treasury after Union troops
triumphed in Texas in 1864 were redeemable. When the case reached the United States Supreme Court
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Lane County v. Oregon,"°  Coyle v. Smith", and Hammer v.
Dagenhart2 - suggests the need for great caution before celebrating
the revival of states' rights. Any accurate historical review of states'
rights must include long traditions of racism and malapportionment,
stretching well into the post-World War II era, even if the faithful are
allowed to forget the nexus between states' rights and the Civil War.
Several constitutional scholars recently advanced impressive new
in 1868, Texas was still considered unreconstructed; in fact, under several Reconstruction Acts passed
in 1867, Texas had been and remained divided into 5 military districts. Chief Justice Chase's opinion,
over dissents by Justices Grier, Swayne, and Miller, held that Texas could bring suit, although Congress
still deemed it an illegal government, and that holders of Texas bonds who took with notice of want of
title acquired no right to payment.
10. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1869). If read in its entirety, this decision gives little comfort to those
who advocate use of the tenth amendment on behalf of states' rights; it gives absolutely none to those
who would so read the tenth amendment to foster local autonomy. The dispute arose toward the end of
the Civil War between Lane County, Oregon and the state of Oregon about whether the county could
pay school and other taxes it owed the state in United States notes, rather than in gold or silver as
demanded by Oregon. The case was thus one of the early rounds in the legal tender cases, treated in
great detail in 6 C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: RECON-
STRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-88 (1971). Even putting to one side the county's claim that it had
collected the taxes in U.S. notes and was acting as a mere conduit, it is unthinkable today that the
Court would hold, as Chief Justice Chase's unanimous opinion did in Lane County, that a state could
reject U.S. notes denominated by Congress as "legal tender for all debts, public and private."
11. 221 U.S. 559 (1911). At first glance, Coyle appears to be one of the most dramatic examples
of congressional overreaching imaginable. It is usually summarized somewhat the way Laurence Tribe
does: "In Coyle v. Smith, the Supreme Court held that Congress cannot tell a state where to locate its
capitol." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 301 (1978). On closer examination, however,
the apparently bizarre congressional behavior becomes less peculiar and Oklahoma begins to seem
somewhat less the innocent victim of egregious overreaching by the federal government. The tangled
tale began with Congress' Enabling Act of 1906, allowing Oklahoma to become a state. That Act
identified a provisional capitol in Guthrie and provided that the capitol should not be moved until 1913.
The Oklahoma Constitution accepted Congress' Enabling Act ordinance as "irrevocable," and a popu-
lar referendum also ratified this congressional condition for statehood. The Sooners quickly decided to
remove their capitol, however, and the issue which reached the United States Supreme Court in 1911
was a conflict between the earlier federal requirement and a 1910 Oklahoma capitol removal act. The
case, therefore, could be viewed as a contest between a commitment Oklahoma solemnly and irrevoca-
bly made, and later insistence that Oklahoma need not wait the remaining 3 years because Oklahoma
was now an independent sovereign state protected by the tenth amendment. This view of the conflict
might explain why Justices McKenna and Holmes filed dissents, albeit without opinions. Holmes
might have gone so far as to allow Congress to "tell a state where to locate its capitol," anyway,
however, since he was hardly a believer in a tenth amendment basis for states' rights. See infra note
151.
12. 247 U.S. 251 (1918). Hammer remains a paradigmatic example of the perils of the dichoto-
mous legal mind at work. Drawing a line between commerce and federal concern on one side and
manufacture and state concern on the other, Justice Day's majority opinion invalidated Congress' at-
tempt to bar interstate commerce in the products of child labor. In his stinging dissent, Justice
Holmes's attack on the Court's formulaic insensitivity to the "ruined lives" at stake helped make the
decision infamous even among lawyers. Thomas Reed Powell's unanswerable critique in Powell, The
Child Labor Law, the Tenth Amendment, and the Commerce Clause, 3 So. L.Q. (now TUL. L. REV.)
175 (1918) also contributed to Hammer's bad reputation. Hammer was overruled in United States v.
Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100, 112 (1941), yet the fall of Hammer begins to seem only cyclical
today.
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policy arguments in support of a structural constitutional approach to
problems of federalism.' 3 None of them, however, has demonstrated
any historical basis for proposed constitutional limitations on congres-
sional power. An appealing, albeit somewhat utopian, vision of par-
ticipatory democracy informs such arguments. Yet the underlying
reality of a long and largely successful history of exclusion, discrimina-
tion, and economic domination in local government remains a bit so-
bering. Moreover, even in recent years, those Justices who would
resuscitate the tenth amendment seem simultaneously willing to de-
cide against bedrock claims of equality and participation of the sort
relied upon by scholars who would add sophisticated localist content
to a capacious tenth amendment view. 1" Today, Carl Swisher's view
of federalism is at least as accurate as it was 40 years ago. Even before
the geometric growth of Big Brother in Washington which followed
World War II, Swisher had an historical response to those who
bemoaned centralized power at the expense of the proper balance of
federalism: "[T]he answer, or one answer, at any rate, is that the Con-
stitution does not provide for any such balance.' 5
13. See, e.g., Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism after
Garcia, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 341; Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 GA. L. REV. 917 (1985); Beschle,
Defining the Scope of State Sovereignty Under the Tenth Amendment: A Structural Approach, 34 DE
PAUL L. REV. 165 (1984); Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value. National League of Cities in
Perspective, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 81; Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role,
79 COLUM. L. REV. 847 (1979); Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: The Permutations of
"Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977); Tribe, Unraveling
National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Serv-
ices, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1977); Note, On Reading and Using the Tenth Amendment, 93 YALE L.J.
723 (1984).
14. See, e.g., Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981) (no constitutional violation in "one acre, one
vote" franchise scheme for municipal corporation which supplies water and electricity to much of Ari-
zona); Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978) (no constitutional violation when nonresident
subject to municipality's police power without being entitled to vote in the city).
15. C. SWISHER, THE GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 36
(1946). The recent publication of additional James Madison papers confirms that the clich6d under-
standing of Madison as a consistent believer in states' rights is an artificial construct. Madison's private
correspondence and public statements verify and bolster interpretations by Irving Brant, Adrienne
Koch, and Gordon Wood in which Madison emerges as a vigorous advocate of national power. At the
time of the Constitutional Convention, Madison considered a dominant national government to be
absolutely necessary to avoid the "centrifugal tendency of the States." He feared that states could
easily be captured by special interests and tyrannical majorities. In 1787, Madison certainly was not
celebrating an enclave of state sovereignty, safe from federal spending power. Instead, Madison fought
for a congressional veto over all state laws and for the power of Congress to legislate in all cases in
which Congress deemed the states incompetent to act. He also battled for a host of other measures to
strengthen the federal government.
Among numerous examples in the massive project involving Madison's papers, PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON (W. Hutchinson, W. Rachal et al. eds. 1962), see, for example, in Volume 9: letter to
Thomas Jefferson (March 19, 1787) (p. 317); Memorandum on the Vices of the Political System of the
United States (April, 1787) (p. 345); letter to Edmund Randolph (April 8, 1787) (p. 368); letter to
George Washington (April 16, 1787) (p. 382). In Volume 16, particularly revealing statements by
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We are accustomed to conflicts among parts of the Constitution
but the text generally provides no tie-breaker. 6 Our usual arguments
about federalism assume a basic conflict between state sovereignty and
the power of the federal government: a battle of truisms. Careful con-
sideration of history will demonstrate, however, that the truisms of the
tenth amendment and the spending power, as well as our practice of
federalism and our amendments to the Constitution, point in the same
direction. Any perceived conflict between Congress' spending power
and a states' rights theory of the tenth amendment actually presents a
false dichotomy. Indeed, the very perception of such a dichotomy is
instructive as an example of a remarkably tenacious error. It is a mis-
take about federalism akin to what historian Jack Hexter termed the
fallacy of "the conservation of historical energy."'" Hexter described
how historians, motivated by "a desire for simple order over a desire
to face the facts," fall into the unconscious trap of using a seesaw the-
ory to describe the world. If there is an increase in something, it is
assumed there must necessarily be a corresponding decrease in a com-
peting something else. t8
Today, it is all too obvious that it is possible to suffer under the
yokes of both federal and state bureaucracies, and that both sometimes
grow in tandem rather than in a zero-sum relationship. Nevertheless,
our current constitutional debate is full of bitter exchanges premised
Madison about the power of the federal government include: letter to his father (May 27, 1787) (p. 10);
notes on his speeches to the constitutional convention on June 6th (pp. 32-36), June 8th (p. 41) (in
which he discusses the problem of the "centrifugal tendency of the States,") June 19th (p. 55), and June
21st (pp. 67-70); letter to Thomas Jefferson (September 6, 1787) (p. 163); letter to Thomas Jefferson
(October 24, 1787) (p. 205).
Apt illustrations of Madison's fear of state government and his hope for republican principles to be
realized on a national scale may be found in THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 45, 46, and 51 (J. Madison). A
statement that appears to point in the other direction may be found in THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (J.
Madison). It is this Federalist Paper which Martin Diamond uses for his argument in Diamond, The
Federalist on Federalism: "Neither a National Nor a Federal Constitution, But a Composition of Both,"
86 YALE L. J. 1273 (1977).
For Madison's views generally, see I. BRANT, JAMES MADISON, FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1950); A. KOCH, JEFFERSON AND MADISON, THE GREAT COLLABORATION (1950); A. KOCH,
MADISON'S "ADVICE To MY COUNTRY" (1966); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN RE-
PUBLIC (1969); and several of Douglass Adair's essays about Madison in FAME AND THE FOUNDING
FATHERS: ESSAYS BY DOUGLASS ADAIR (T. Colburn, ed. 1974). See also G. WILLS, EXPLAINING
AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST (1981) and Edmund S. Morgan's review of Wills's book, Refining the
Public Spirit, (Book Review), 184 NEw REPUBLIC 26 (January 14, 1981).
16. See generally Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78 COLUM. L. REV.
1022 (1978).
17. Hexter's elegant essay on A.F. Pollard, FACTORS IN MODERN HISTORY (1907) appears in J.
HEXTER, REAPPRAISALS IN HISTORY 26, 40-44 (1962). Thomas Bender provides a useful commentary
and expansion upon Hexter's point in T. BENDER, COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA
29-43 (1978).
18. Hexter, supra note 17 at 33, 40.
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on a fundamental constitutional clash between nation and states over a
fixed pie 9 of sovereignty.
In exploring the perceived conflict between a grant of national
spending power and an affirmative protection for reserved state power,
I will make an old-fashioned claim that constitutional history and text
actually may aid understanding. It seems fitting to discuss history, the
spending power, and the tenth amendment in tandem now for several
additional reasons. Most obviously, the Supreme Court's change of
heart or mind in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author-
ity2° - more precisely the switch by Justice Blackmun - is couched
in language reminiscent of the bitterness which accompanied the tem-
porary resurrection of the tenth amendment in National League of Cit-
ies v. Usery.2" The initial outpouring of scholarly comment on Garcia
- surely soon to become a flood - is also unusually impassioned.
William Van Alstyne, for example, recently 'wrote that Garcia appar-
ently contains an idea "fundamentally pernicious to the integrity and
morale of American constitutional law." 22 In National League of Cit-
ies v. Usery, "[t]he Court, in some small measure, had come home,"
but in Garcia, the majority committed "a mistake of historic propor-
tions," according to Van Alstyne.23
The opinions in Garcia exemplify how both sides in the constitu-
tional debate about federalism tend to abuse history. Moreover, any
case is surely worthy of notice when four Justices argue that "the
Court's action reflects a serious misunderstanding, if not an outright
rejection, of the history of our country and the intention of the Fram-
ers of our Constitution."24
It is against this background of charged rhetoric that I wish to
review briefly the history of the tenth amendment and the notions of
19. The image of American federalism as a "chaotic marble cake" generally is credited to Morton
Grodzins. See Grodzins, Centralization and Decentralization in the American System, in A NATION OF
STATES 1, 4 (R. Goldwin ed. 1963). In his Federalism and Legal Process article, supra note 1, Harry
Scheiber indicates that Joseph E. McLean may have been responsible for the "layer cake" image, which
Grodzins attacked with his marble cake metaphor. Grodzins argued that "all areas of American gov-
ernment are involved in all functions," Grodzins, supra, at 3, and also cautioned that "[t]hose who
attempt to decentralize by order are far more likely to produce centralization by order." Id. at 21-22.
20. 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
21. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
22. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1709, 1722 (1985).
23. Id. at 1733, 1731. A.E. Dick Howard is only slightly more restrained in his article about
Garcia, see supra note 6. Howard says, for example, "[t]he Court in Garcia abdicates a function that
history, principle, and an understanding of the political process strongly argue that the federal judiciary
should undertake." Id. at 790. Once warmed up, Howard accuses the Garcia majority of "a glaring
disregard of a basic truth about American constitutionalism" and of "read[ing] an important part of the
Founders' assumptions out of the constitutional order." Id. at 791, 795. In fact, Garcia "leaves an
important constitutional sentry post unmanned." Id. at 796.
24. 105 S. Ct. at 1032.
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federalism which surround it. First, I will suggest that the most com-
pelling interpretation of the original intent behind the tenth amend-
ment does not include its use as a judicially-enforced barrier to protect
states' rights. Even if I am wrong in my interpretivist claim, however,
in the second part I will argue that there is an important, relevant
pattern to be found in the constitutional amending process since 1791.
This pattern, though generally unnoticed, strongly suggests that when
Americans engage in the serious business of constitutional amend-
ment, we tend to enhance federal power. Additionally, actual practice
helps confirm my claim that the tenth amendment provides no consti-
tutionally enforceable barrier against congressional action.
I will conclude with the Court's responses to the perceived clash
between the spending power and the tenth amendment in United
States v. Butler.25 This focus is particularly appropriate now, exactly
fifty years after that peculiar decision. The Supreme Court announced
both a broad view of the spending power and a broad construction of
the tenth amendment in Butler. The spending power has been squared
many times in the intervening years, while the tenth amendment has
nearly disappeared. Yet it was in United States v. Butler that Justice
Roberts's majority opinion explained that the Court's duty really is
quite simple:
When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts
as not conforming to the constitutional mandate the judicial
branch of the Government has only one duty, - to lay the article
of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is
challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the
former.2 6
Invalidation of the Agriculture Adjustment Act for its failure to
square with the Court's idea that farming somehow is, by definition, a
local concern makes little sense today. But other aspects of the mys-
tery of what the Butler actually did are more relevant to our concerns.
Butler remains an important modern cautionary tale. Today, we are
again well-launched into a period when "loose conceptions with halos
over them" 7 seem to dominate. As in days of old, the tenth amend-
ment is now advanced to provide a constitutional hook. As in cases
such as Butler and Hammer v. Dagenhart, many again leap to renewed
25. 297 U.S. 1 (1936) see infra notes 108-13.
26. Id. at 62. See also Graglia, Judicial Review on the Basis of 'Regime Principles': A Prescription
for Government by Judges, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 435, 439 (1985) (embracing Roberts's view described as a
"famous modern restatement of the Marbury rationale").
27. Powell, supra note 12, at 189. The introduction of the tenth amendment, according to Powell,
"brings to play loose conceptions with halos over them, and thereby confuses the mind in dealing with
the genuine issue."
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faith in the ability of judges to hold the line of federalism. Using nos-
talgia combined with true belief, the faithful divine hidden meanings
and proclaim penumbral boundaries, even as they preach strict
construction.
I. THE RECENT TENTH AMENDMENT DEBATE: THE FALLACY OF
FUNDAMENTAL FEDERALISM
The modem high-water mark for judicial invocation of states'
rights as a restraint on congressional action came in the mid-1970s.
The Court expanded notions of comity and federalism to restrict fed-
eral courts in their use of civil rights statutes and to narrow the reach
of federal habeas corpus.2". Simultaneously, the Court established a
broad eleventh amendment prohibition. It is a barrier strong enough
to deny a plaintiff in federal court his federal right if the remedy he
seeks can be classified as retrospective relief, even if a state clearly has
flaunted federal statutory commands.29
The most dramatic, most discussed example of the Court's re-
newed devotion occurred in National League of Cities v. Usery.30 In
that decision, the Court found a constitutional limit to Congress' com-
merce clause power for the first time in 40 years. Although Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion was vague about the constitutional
source of protection for "integral," "essential," and "traditional" state
functions from the perceived congressional threat in the application of
28. There has been extensive commentary on the phenomenon, to understate the point. For a
survey, see C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 22A, 53, 53A (4th ed. 1983). My favorite on the
equitable powers issues, perhaps not surprisingly, is still Soifer & Macgill, The Younger Doctrine: Re-
constructing Reconstruction, 55 TEXAS L. REV. 1141 (1977). On restrictions of the availability of
habeas corpus, see Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991 (1985); Cover &
Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977). For an
impressive general rethinking of many of these issues, see Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837 (1984).
29. See, e.g., Green v. Mansour, 106 S. Ct. 423, 426 (1985) (compensatory or deterrence interests
insufficient to overcome dictates of eleventh amendment); Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Hald-
erman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (severely limiting construction of federal bill of rights for the handicapped in
shadow of eleventh amendment); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (eleventh amendment per-
mits only prospective relief against state officials). The Court clearly has come a long way from the
brave proclamation in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) that "the very essence of
liberty" as well as the "high appellation" of "a government of laws, and not of men" depends upon
assuring that the laws provide "remedy for the violation of vested legal right." (This "high appellation"
may represent the summit of American faith in law, but it presumably was not a reference to mountains
near the eastern seaboard). See also Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S: Ct. 668 (1986); Daniels v. Williams,
106 S. Ct. 662 (1986). The binary approach within many of the Court's recent decisions is reminiscent
of Chief Justice John Marshall's idea in Marbury that "[between . . alternatives there is no middle
ground," 5 U.S. at 177. Of course, comparing what Marshall said and what he actually did in that
great case somewhat undermines both his assertion about remedies for rights and his dichotomous view
of legal reasoning.
30. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
federal minimum wage and overtime provisions to state employees,3" a
passing reference to the tenth amendment, combined with the lack of
any other textual basis, made National League of Cities appear to be a
tenth amendment decision.
Less noticed, however, was Justice Rehnquist's cryptic footnote
cordoning off the issue of whether Congress might ignore or otherwise
evade the barrier erected in National League of Cities simply by invok-
ing the spending power or some other source of congressional power
perceived to give authority broader than that which the commerce
clause provides.32 Indeed, within weeks of the National League of Cit-
ies decision, Justice Rehnquist himself wrote for a unanimous Court in
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer33 that Congress could overcome states' rights ob-
jections to the extension of civil rights protections to state employees
when federal legislation rested on section 5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Moreover, the National League of Cities majority depended on
a concurring opinion by Justice Blackmun which initially appeared,
and certainly proved to be, good for that day and that day only.
Attempts to apply National League of Cities underscored its nar-
row basis.34 In fact, the Court generally seemed less dedicated to the
expansion of states' rights after the mid-1970s, though the application
of federalism to particular cases remained quite unpredictable. When
the Court requested reargument and briefing on the issue of the appro-
priate scope of the tenth amendment,35 the outcome in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority hardly came as a great sur-
prise. In addition to similar results in other cases, the Court had de-
cided in favor of federal power in a case involving a state mass transit
system,36 and initially remanded the Garcia case for reconsideration
on the basis of that decision. 37 It was easy to predict, therefore, that
San Antonio could not first accept $51 million in federal transit aid
and then successfully claim a constitutional shield from federal
control.
What is surprising about the Garcia decision, however, and what
makes it important for our general consideration of possible conflict
between the spending power and the tenth amendment, is more what
31. Id. at 845, 851-2, 854.
32. Id. at 852 n.17.
33. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
34. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983); Federal
Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982); United Transportation Union v. Long
Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678 (1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S.
264 (1981).
35. 104 S. Ct. 3582 (1984).
36. United Transportation Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678 (1982).
37. 457 U.S. 1102 (1982) (vacating and remanding Garcia and companion cases).
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the majority opinion by Justice Blackmun said than what it did. Even
more significant is the tenth amendment approach found within Jus-
tice Powell's bitter dissent.
A. The Garcia Majority: Process, Not Results
We can almost picture that wily old magician, Justice Brennan,
rubbing his hands as he assigned the Garcia majority opinion to Jus-
tice Blackmun. With some of the fervor of a convert, Justice Black-
mun's opinion rests primarily on his argument that the attempts to
apply National League of Cities demonstrate that no clear constitu-
tional boundary can be drawn between state and federal functions.
His pragmatic pessimism is reinforced by his glance back at the com-
plex doctrinal entanglements of the bad old days of dual federalism.
Therefore, according to Justice Blackmun, it is necessary to rely on
process rather than results to'decide federalism questions. The Garcia
majority assumes that there is adequate protection of states' interests
in Congress. Moreover, Blackmun goes out of his way to make clear
that his decision does not depend on the 51 million carrots of gold
connecting San Antonio's buses to the federal trough - and the fed-
eral stick. Accordingly, the Garcia holding explicitly is not limited to
the spending power loophole left open in National League of Cities.38
Three further points are noteworthy about Justice Blackmun's
Garcia opinion. First, reports that the Garcia majority entirely rejects
the idea of judicial review of actions by the national government, even
when those actions threaten the essence of state functions, are exagger-
ated. On close reading, Justice Blackmun's opinion hedges about' the
issue in several places, and even seems to concede that congressional
process could prove inadequate.39 If there is still any constitutional
essence of state sovereignty to serve as a constitutional limit, however,
Justice O'Connor is accurate in pointing out, in her separate dissent,
that it is indeed a very "weak 'essence'. '
38. 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1020 n.21 (1985). Earlier decisions indicated that the distinction between the
commerce clause and the power of Congress to spend for the general welfare might be important. See,
e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90 (1976) (general welfare clause as "grant of power ... which is
quite expansive");'North Carolina v. Califano, 435 U.S. 962 (1978), aff'g 445 F. Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C.
1977) (unanimous summary affirmance of a three judge District Court holding that Congress could
constitutionally condition health care aid on certificate of need requirement, despite violation of state
constitution); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (plurality opinion). A good indication of the
malleability of federalism concepts may be found in the contrasting critiques of Garcia by Professors
Van Alstyne and Stewart. Van Alstyne defends National League of Cities because it invalidated an
"[a]ct of Congress which was all stick and no carrot," see supra note 6, at 1714, while Stewart finds
federal carrots to be a pernicious mode of congressional invasion of state prerogatives meriting particu-
larly skeptical judicial scrutiny. See supra note 6, at 971.
39. 105 S. Ct. at 1017-18, 1020.
40. Id. at 1033 (O'Connor, J., dissenting with Powell, Rehnquist, J.J.). O'Connor's opinion offers
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Next, Justice Blackmun seems to rest his new view of federalism
not on pragmatic grounds alone, but also on unspecified "postulates"
he discovers "behind the words of the constitution," postulates which
"limit and control."' 4 ' This kind of mysticism is the mirror image of
the dissenters' faith in an undifferentiated concept of what they sense
to be the requirements of Our Federalism. To paraphrase John Ely
and Bertrand Russell: "These are my fundamental postulates; those
are your abstract, unanchored, wooly generalities; I have the votes and
I win." This approach to federalism does not foster confidence.
Finally, as I will show, Justice Blackmun seems altogether too
quick to concede the historical argument to the dissenters. In address-
ing the traditional state function approach suggested by National
League of Cities, Justice Blackmun argues, "Reliance on history as an
organizing principle results in line-drawing of the most arbitrary
sort."42 But Justice Blackmun's willingness to abandon the historical
debate to the dissenters goes further. The majority's historical argu-
ment consists only of a curious pastiche of quotations from James
Madison and James Wilson, a few passes at The Federalist, and a ref-
erence to Justice Field's dissenting opinion in Baltimore & Ohio R.R.
Co. v. Baugh.43 The Garcia majority advances these historical snippets
merely to support the claim that "we have no license to employ free
standing conceptions of state sovereignty when measuring congres-
sional authority under the Commerce Clause."'
Justice Blackmun also quotes an important, directly relevant
statement by James Madison in 1791, but he uses it as a makeweight.
This speech by Madison came early in his long journey from a passion-
ate belief in the need for a !strong national government, advanced in
1787, to a view that the states retained the power to interpose their
a good illustration of the difficulty inherent in invoking mystical concepts in judicial decisions about
federalism, such as "the spirit of the tenth amendment," at 1036 (emphasis in original).
41. Id. at 1016, quoting Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934). This is a
rather curious source, since Chief Justice Hughes's opinion for a unanimous Court marked the grand
finale in the long effort by bondholders to force southern states to live up to commitments they had
expressed through the issuance of bonds. As it had done for half a century, the Court again found a
dubious eleventh amendment bar against such suits and thereby relieved the southern states (with the
occasional exception of Virginia) of their obligations. See generally J. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF
THE UNITED STATES: THE HISTORY OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT (forthcoming, 1986) (copy on
file at U. Colo. L. Rev.); Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinter-
pretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983).
42. 105 S. Ct. at 1014.
43. 149 U.S. 368, 401 (1893), quoted id. at 1017. The Baugh citation and the accompanying state-
ment that Field's Baugh dissent was "quoted with approval in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins" is quite
peculiar. Justice Brandeis's Erie opinion would seem to give comfort to those such as Justice Powell
and the other dissenters, who favor an unspecified but potent metaconstitutional enclave of state sover-
eignty. See generally Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 701-04 (1974).
44. 105 S. Ct. at 1017.
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constitutional interpretations against the national government,
adopted in 1798.11 In Congress, in the course of debate over the Bank
of the United States, Madison said:
[I]nterference with the power of the States was no constitutional
criterion of the powers of Congress. If the power was not given,
Congress could not exercise it; if given, they might exercise it,
although it should interfere with the laws, or even the Constitution
of the States.46
This view, which came after Madison's fervor for a strong national
government had dampened, and after Jefferson returned to the United
States and began to articulate a states' rights view, indicates that
Madison still did not believe that the tenth amendment created a con-
stitutional wall to protect state sovereignty. As I will discuss in a
moment, Madison's statements surrounding the passage of the tenth
amendment a few years earlier underscore this point.
B. The Dissent: Politics and Passion
Justice Powell is the author of the lead dissent in Garcia, while
Justice Rehnquist adds a prophecy that Justice Blackmun's approach
will be short-lived and Justice O'Connor writes to contain the damage
she perceives in the majority opinion. Justice Powell's primary target
is the growth of the federal bureaucracy, a consequence of political
and structural changes since 1954 which, in his view, combine to make
Congress insensitive to state and local values. It was in 1954 that Her-
bert Wechsler wrote his famous article47 asserting that federal law is
interstitial and, because state interests are represented in various ways
45. Forrest McDonald terms Madison "an ideologue in search of an ideology" and explains that
Madison abandoned his theories of vigorous nationalism a few years after the constitutional convention.
By then, Madison began to fear the triumph of Hamiltonianism; moreover, Madison's hated political
rival, Patrick Henry, no longer blocked Madison's way in Virginia politics. F. McDONALD, Novus
ORDO SECULORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 203 (1985). Despite two
important caveats - and a reminder that it is something of a myth to consider Madison the Father of
the Constitution - McDonald describes Madison as "an ardent advocat[e] of a purely national system"
whose constitutional plan called for a government "purely national, the states having no agency in it
whatsoever." Id. at 236, 206. See also supra note 15. Cf Banning, The Hamiltonian Madison: A
Reconsideration, 40 WM. & MARY Q. 227 (3d Ser. 1983).
46. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1897 (1791). For discussion of this important speech, see, for example,
A.T. MASON, THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE 186-97 (1966); Berns, The Meaning of the Tenth Amend-
ment, A NATION OF STATES 126 (R. Goldwin ed. 1963).
47. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition
and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). See also J. CHOPER, JUDI-
CIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE
ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980). See generally Gelfand, The Burger Court and the New Federal-
ism: Preliminary Reflections on the Roles of Local Government Actors in the Political Dramas of the
1980's, 21 B.C.L. REV. 763 (1980); Henderson & Pearson, Implementing Federal Environmental Poli-
cies: The Limits of Aspirational Commands, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1429 (1978); Stewart, Pyramids of
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within the federal branches of government, the structure adequately
serves and protects state interests. Justice Powell argues that politics
and government have changed greatly since 1954.48 To paraphrase,
one might say, "In the interstices, there lurks a far worse disease."
Justice Powell is particularly appalled by the majority's notion
that Congress is an adequate clearinghouse for state interests. He goes
so far as to assert that "[tihis Court never before abdicated its respon-
sibility on the ground that affected parties theoretically are able to
look out for their own interests through the electoral process. ' 49  He
apparently forgets his own votes in the recent series of standing deci-
sions, such as Allen v. Wright"° and Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United,5 as well as his forceful concurring opinion in
United States v. Richardson, 2 which went further than Chief Justice
Burger's opinion to deny standing and relegate those with constitu-
tional complaints to their remedy at the polls. Justice Powell also ig-
nores several major lines of constitutional doctrine stretching back
more than a century to Munn v. Illinois,53 for example, and the
Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Pol-
icy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977).
48. 105 S. Ct. at 1025-26 n.9. Powell emphasizes the increased role of congressional staff members
and federal bureaucracy; he also imports whole cloth to the setting of federalism the notion that there is
an inherent "hydraulic pressure" in each branch of the federal government to "exceed the outer limits
of its power." Id. at 1025, quoting Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983). Justice Powell also relies on the recent Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations
report, Regulatory Federalism: Policy, Process, Impact and Reform (1984), itself not obviously the
product of participatory democracy.
49. 105 S. Ct. at 1026 n.12.
50. 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984).
51. 454 U.S. 464 (1984).
52. "Relaxation of standing requirements is directly related to the expansion of judicial power. It
seems to me inescapable that allowing unrestricted taxpayer or citizen standing would significantly alter
the allocation of power at the national level, with a shift away from a democratic form of government.
I also believe that repeated and essentially head-on confrontations between the life-tenured branch and
the representative branches of government will not, in the long run, be beneficial to either. The public
confidence essential to the former and the vitality critical to the latter may well erode if we do not
exercise self-restraint in the utilization of our power to negative the actions of the other branches. We
should be ever mindful of the contradictions that would arise if a democracy were to permit general
oversight of the elected branches of government by a nonrepresentative, and in large measure insulated
judicial branch. Moreover, the argument that the Court should allow unrestricted taxpayer or citizen
standing underestimates the ability of the representative branches of the Federal Government to re-
spond to the citizen pressure that has been responsible in large measure for the current drift toward
expanded standing. Indeed, taxpayer or citizen advocacy, given its potentially broad base, is precisely
the type of leverage that in a democracy ought to be employed against the branches that were intended
to be responsive to public attitudes about the appropriate operation of government." (Citations omit-
ted.) 418 U.S. 166, 188-89 (1974).
53. 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877). In upholding state police power to regulate matters "affected with a
public interest," Chief Justice Waite wrote: "We know that this is a power which may be abused; but
that is no argument against its existence. For protection against abuses by legislatures the people must
resort to the polls." In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824), Chief Justice Marshall
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Court's history of decisions construing the guarantee clause of article
IV,54 to say nothing of other so-called political questions."
Justice Powell seems at least as upset by Garcia as Justice Bren-
nan was by National League of Cities. To Justice Powell, the majority
opinion "substantially alters the federal system embodied in the con-
stitution" and "rejects almost 200 years of the understanding of the
constitutional status of federalism." 5 6 Moreover, he asserts that
whether or not federal funding is involved, "the constitutional ques-
tion remains the same: whether the federal statute violates the sover-
eign powers reserved to the States by the tenth amendment." 57 The
tenth amendment, according to Justice Powell, plays an "integral role
. . . in our constitutional theory."58 Further, "judicial enforcement of
the Tenth Amendment is essential to maintaining the federal system so
carefully designed by the Framers and adopted in the Constitution."59
Justice Powell's final flourish is his statement that "[t]he Court's
action reflects a serious misunderstanding, if not an outright rejection,
of the history of our country and the intention of the Framers of our
Constitution."'  Unfortunately, his own understanding of that history
and what it says about the tenth amendment relies almost exclusively
on his own conclusory assertions supplemented by references to sev-
eral of the Federalist papers, specifically Nos. 17, 39, and 45.
There are two central difficulties with using The Federalist as
one's primary historical source. First, that magnificent campaign doc-
ument was written more than a year before Madison reluctantly pro-
posed the tenth amendment to the First Congress, an amendment
Madison considered "perhaps . . . superfluous" and "unnecessary,"
made a similar argument about Congress' discretion and the people's resort to the polls as "sole re-
straints" on which the people would generally rely to restrain Congress, thereby presenting a view of
federalism and the judicial role quite opposed to the state sovereignty-enforcing view advanced by Jus-
tice Powell in Garcia.
54. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). See generally W. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE
CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (1972); Note, The Rule of Law and the States: A New Interpreta-
tion of the Guarantee Clause, 93 YALE L.J. 561 (1984). Ironically, Butler and his allies raised a guaran-
tee clause claim in the district court in the case which became United States v. Butler; it was rather
summarily rejected by Judge Elisha Brewster. Judge Brewster also rejected other constitutional argu-
ments made against the AAA, though he took them more seriously. See Franklin Process Co. v.
Hoosac Mills Corp., 8 F. Supp. 552, 562 (D. Mass. 1934).
55. See generally Henkin, Is There a 'Political Question' Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976);
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
56. 105 S. Ct. at 1021, 1023.
57. Id. at 1026 n. 10. To Justice Powell, the success of states in obtaining federal funds is simply
not relevant to tenth amendment questions, which are "a matter of constitutional law, not of legislative
grace." Id. at 1026.
58. Id. at 1028.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1032.
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but probably harmless.6' Second, even greater difficulty arises because
The Federalist was obviously and purposefully ambiguous on basic is-
sues of federalism.
There are many eloquent statements in favor of a national govern-
ment with conclusive power in The Federalist, just as there are many
in support of states' rights. This leads to the kind of selective quota-
tion Justice Powell employs when, for example, he quotes Federalist
No. 39 as illustrative of commitment to a states' rights limit on na-
tional power. He thereby misses Madison's thrust in that very essay,
which is that the constitutional scheme provides for a mixed govern-
ment - national when necessary, federal for other purposes.62
As one scholar recently put it: "It is apparent that The Federal-
ist's ambiguous language can be invoked by both sides to support de-
sired conclusions."63 All too often, resort to The Federalist to resolve
a dichotomous historical issue about federalism is reminiscent of the
Marx Brothers in a scene from "Coconuts." Chico is the shill and
Groucho the auctioneer of Florida real estate. The scene goes some-
thing like this: Whenever someone bids, Chico raises the bid; finally,
somewhat frustrated by the process, Chico answers Groucho's "Do I
hear $600?" with, "$600, $700, I got lots more numbers!"
Many, and often a majority, of the current Justices indulge in
wistful remembrances such as Justice Powell's ahistorical history; they
like to recall an imaginary clear and convincing past. The recent spate
of eleventh amendment decisions provides a good illustration. Sover-
eign immunity is a realm in which states' rights faith is still ascendant.
In a footnote in the majority opinion in Atascadero State Hospital v.
Scanlon,64 for example, Justice Powell states:
61. James Madison, Speech Placing the Proposed Bill-of-Rights Amendment Before the House of
Representatives, June 8, 1789, 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 440-60 (1789-91, 1st Cong.), excerpts quoted in A.
MASON, THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE 185 (1966) and discussed at 94-96. See also W. CROSSKEY, I
POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 675-90 (1953); Berns,
supra note 46, at 138.
62. See, e.g., D. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 51-54 (1984) which
discusses FEDERALIST No. 39 in terms of Madison's insistence on a republican form of government,
and analyzes Madison's denigration of attempts to distinguish between confederacy and consolidation.
Hamilton in FEDERALIST No. 9 was even more skeptical than Madison of such line drawing efforts
("(this principle] has been the cause of incurable disorder and imbecility in the government"). See also
Diamond, What the Framers Meant By Federalism, A NATION OF STATES 24 (R. Goldwin ed. 1963);
Scheiber, supra note 1.
63. Wilson, The Most Sacred Text: The Supreme Court's Use of THE FEDERALIST Papers, 1985
B.Y.U. L. REV. 65, 87. See also, e.g., Adair, The Authorship of the Disputed Federalist Papers, I WIL-
LIAM & MARY Q. 97 (3rd ser. 1944), reprinted in FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: ESSAYS BY
DOUGLASS ADAIR (T. Colbourn ed. 1984), supra note 15; Mason, THE FEDERALIST: A Split Personal-
ity, 57 AM. HIST. REV. 625 (1962); G. Wills, supra note 15.
64. 105 S. Ct. 3142, 3146 n.2 (1985).
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[N]one of the Framers questioned that the Constitution created a
federal system with some authority expressly granted the federal
government and the remainder retained by the several states.
This statement is misguided in at least three important ways. First,
some of the framers most certainly did question the efficacy of a fed-
eral system. Neither all nor even most of them shared Justice Powell's
view of what the Constitution created, unless Alexander Hamilton,
George Washington, and even James Madison rather consistently in
1787, do not count as framers.6 5
Second, the statement neglects the final phrase of the tenth
amendment, which reserves power to the people. It is a serious blun-
der to view federalism as a binary or zero-sum phenomenon. This is
particularly so when the text invoked as the source for this view ex-
plicitly mentions three sides. The role of the people as the source of
constitutional authority became a hotly debated issue in the ratifica-
tion process. At the Virginia convention, for example, Patrick Henry
emphasized that the concept of state sovereignty "turned, sir, on that
poor thing - the expression, 'we, the people,' instead of the states of
America."66 Henry therefore opposed ratification of the Constitution,
as did his fellow Virginians George Mason and James Monroe, as well
as many other eloquent states' rights advocates. At the very least,
their opposition is difficult to explain on Justice Powell's theory. So is
Chief Justice John Marshall's insistence on the people as the source of
constitutional power in the most crucial passages in McCulloch v.
Maryland.6
7
Third, Justice Powell comes close to repeating a common error
committed, for example, in three cases often invoked by states' rights
65. Of course, it is difficult to encapsulate the thought of any one of these Framers, to say nothing
of trying to capture them all confidently to find them unified, as Powell suggests. Hamilton, for exam-
ple, is notorious for his belief in a strong national government and he had to fend off charges that he
hoped to eliminate the states altogether. Yet Hamilton wrote FEDERALIST Nos. 9, 28, 31, 32, and 33,
for instance, which concede state sovereignty in terms such as a comparision to "independent nations,"
No. 28, and "complete sovereignty" in the states, No. 31. Elsewhere, of course, Hamilton lived up to
his image as a firm advocate of power in the national government, to the point that he appeared ready
to abandon the states altogether, see 3 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
282-93, 322-34 (1911). For the strong nationalist views of James Wilson, see id. at 138-143. Similarly,
Madison not always, but generally, favored the plan he proposed on the eve of the Convention, which
would provide "a due supremacy of the national authority, and leave in force the local authorities so far
as they can be subordinately useful." Madison's letter to Edmund Randolph (April 8, 1787) in 9 PA-
PERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 15 at 368. Edmund Randolph, at least in private, also appeared
ready to abandon the states, and George Washington was close to that. See generally W. HAMILTON &
D. ADAIR, THE POWER TO GOVERN: THE CONSTITUTION - THEN AND Now (1937).
66. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FED-
ERAL CONSTITUTION 72 (J. Elliot ed. 1836), quoted and discussed in A. MASON, supra note 61, at 67.
67. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404-405 (1819). Marshall borrowed liberally from Madison's essays
in FEDERALIST Nos. 43-44 for this point and for his rhetoric.
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advocates to establish a reputable pedigree for their constitutional ar-
gument: Lane County v. Oregon,6" Collector v. Day,69 and Hammer v.
Dagenhart.7' The tenth amendment text, states' rights proponents as-
sume, contains the word "expressly" as a limit on the grant of powers
to the national government. 71  Not only is that limitation not to be
found in the amendment, but it cannot even be claimed that its omis-
sion was inadvertent. Like the Romans thrice offering a crown to Ju-
lius Caesar, those who advocated states' rights three times proposed
that the word "expressly" be added to the text of the tenth amend-
ment. Three times, James Madison successfully led the battle against
their proposed addition.72
In McCulloch v. Maryland, surely the keystone for subsequent
analysis of federalism in constitutional law, Chief Justice Marshall
stressed that the word "expressly" was omitted from the tenth amend-
ment precisely because "[t]he men who drew and adopted this amend-
ment had experienced the embarrassments resulting from the insertion
of this word in the articles of confederation, and probably omitted it,
to avoid these embarrassments. '73 In terms of original intent, no one
has ever made a credible argument that the tenth amendment's reser-
vation of powers to the states or to the people was anything other than
a declaration and reaffirmation of the distribution of powers made in
the original constitutional text.
I am pleased to find myself in illustrious company on this point,
not only with Professor Crosskey, as one might expect, but also with
68. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869).
69. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 125 (1871) (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76
(1869).
70. 247 U.S. 251, 275 (1918).
71. A striking, relatively recent example of how one's basic assumptions can produce fallacious
"quotations" is to be found in Justice Harlan's dissent in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 201 (1970):
"When the Constitution with its original Amendments came into being, the States delegated some of
their sovereign powers to the Federal Government, surrendered other powers, and expressly retained
all powers not delegated or surrendered. Amdt. X." For a good discussion of the history of the "ex-
pressly" fallacy, see Berns, supra note 46, at 133-37. Justice Joseph Story firmly decried efforts "to foist
into the text the word 'expressly'; to qualify what is general, and obscure what is clear and defined." J.
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1901 (1833). See also,
e.g., Powell, Joseph Story's COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION: A Belated Review, 94 YALE L. J.
1285 (1985); W. CROSSKEY, supra note 61, at 679-84. Crosskey discusses at some length the idea that
the word "expressly" actually meant something different in the late 18th century. For further discus-
sion of the changing meaning of the same constitutional terminology, see F. MCDONALD, supra note
45, at xi-xii.
72. The articles of confederation had included the "expressly" limitation. According to the frag-
mentary record of the debates in the House of Representatives in August-September, 1789, Madison
answered the arguments made on behalf of the motion to add the term made by Tucker of South
Carolina by explaining "there must necessarily be admitted powers by implication, unless the Constitu-
tion descended to recount every minutiae," quoted in W. CROSSKEY, supra note 61, at 682.
73. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406-07 (1819).
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Professors Corwin, Powell, Mason, Brant, Koch, Scheiber, Ely, Wood
and even Walter Berns.74 What is startling about the dissents in Gar-
cia is that their authors, self-proclaimed strict constructionists, seem
unconcerned with anything that may be discerned about the original
understanding of the tenth amendment. Perhaps some subliminal fear
about reawakening its companion, the ninth amendment, helps to ex-
plain this curious phenomenon. Perhaps the prevalent fashion for nos-
talgia today would be tattered, if not torn asunder, by actual
knowledge of our past. Most probably, however, neither the Justices
in the majority nor the dissenters in Garcia want to use history to
determine how to vote; rather, a pale version of law-office history pro-
vides each side with a few rhetorical steps along a road already
taken.75
II. THE BAD NEWS Is: No PRINCIPLES NEED APPLY
There is not now, nor has there ever been, a principled rule of law
to limit the power of Congress to spend for "the general Welfare." 76
Assumptions that a clear line must or should be back in time some-
where cannot substitute for actual history. Moreover, there exists no
74. The amendment proclaimed what was widely believed to be a postulate of the science of
government and the theory of republican ideals: Congress could not exceed its powers. Instead of an
enclave of state sovereignty to be invoked by judges to invalidate federal actions, however, the tenth
amendment established a precatory line of demarcation and the audience was to include legislators and
voters. In addition to attempting to calm the "excessive jealousies" to which Marshall referred in
McCulloch v. Maryland, id. at 425, the tenth amendment reflected a late eighteenth century presump-
tion that the people remained free to speak through and to their representatives in Congress about
constitutional powers and rights. The "wholly popular" government was free to alter the balance, if
the people so wished, even if at the expense of state sovereignty. See generally D. EPSTEIN, THE
POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 43-54 (1984); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 1776-1787, 519-564 (1969); R. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS
IN THE YOUNG. REPUBLIC (1971); B. HAMMOND, BANK AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR (1958).
75. See generally C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY (1969);
tenBroek, Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction, 26
CALIF. L. REV. 664 (1938). As Alexander Bickel put it, "[in almost regular cyclical fashion, we wit-
ness atavistic regressions to the simplicities of Marbury v. Madison, to its concept of the self-applying
Constitution and the self-evident function of judicial- review." A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 74 (1962).
76. The full sentence in article I, § 8, cl. I is: "The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general
Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the
United States." For an intriguing tale of a clever, but unsuccessful, effort by Gouverneur Morris to
insert a semicolon between "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises" and "to pay the debts
and provide for the common defense and general welfare" in order to change the meaning of the sen-
tence, see F. MCDONALD, supra note 45, at 264-65. The kind of true-believing, originalist textualism
which relied exclusively upon such matters was characterized as "government by semicolon" in Mc-
Bain, The Supreme Court and the States, 16 PROC. ACAD. OF POL. Sci. 464 (1936), quoted in J. CLARK,
THE RISE OF A NEW FEDERALISM 283-84 (1938).
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
interpretation based upon constitutional structure to establish worka-
ble limitations on Congress' authority to act for what Congress be-
lieves to be the public good, except for limitations premised on the
rights of individuals protected elsewhere in the Constitution.
This is disheartening. A nice, orderly rule of law to which insis-
tent and genuine problems of federalism might be referred is some-
thing devoutly to be wished. Legal symmetry, at least in our chaotic
world, would make most of us feel more secure. But as Henry Adams
said of the purported revelations of modem science: "Chaos was the
law of nature; Order the dream of man."17 7 Both the origin and the
evolution of our peculiar species of constitutional federalism suggest
that Congress but not the courts, politics but not principle, will have
the final say about what the general welfare is, and if and how govern-
ment should spend for it.
Chief Justice John Marshall echoed James Madison's words at
the Constitutional Convention when he proclaimed in McCulloch that
the Federal government proceeded not from the states, but "directly
from the people."' 78  Federal power "required not the affirmance, and
could not be negatived, by the State governments."79
Instead of following Madison and Marshall, our newest New
Federalism uncannily echoes the view of federalism espoused by Pres-
ident Franklin Pierce in 1854. It was Pierce's position which Justice
77. H. ADAMS, THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS 451 (1918), quoted and discussed in D. HOL-
LINGER, MORRIS R. COHEN AND THE SCIENTIFIC IDEAL 100 (1975). Madison actually wrote a re-
markable, exceptionally modern-sounding digression on issues of indeterminacy in science, human
perception, and language in FEDERALIST No. 37. Cf. A Most Ingenious Paradox in S. GOULD, THE
FLAMINGO'S SMILE: REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL HISTORY 78 (1985).
78. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403 (1819). Marshall also emphasized that it was the national legisla-
ture which was intended as a focus for the confidence of the people, id. at 431. Indeed, Marshall articu-
lated his fear of "prostrating (the federal government) at the foot of the states" and declared that "the
American people ... did not design to make their government dependent on the States," id. at 432.
Even during this, the height of what Leonard Levy aptly termed the "Screaming Eagle Phase" of our
constitutional history, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - HISTORICAL ESSAYS 6 (L. Levy ed.
1966), Marshall borrowed heavily from Madison's views in the late 1780s and went no further than
Madison earlier had gone in asserting the necessity for a powerful federal government whose powers
were not diminished by state sovereignty. Marshall's reliance on The Federalist papers in McCulloch is
hardly surprising, since, as David Epstein convincingly summarizes them, "[t]he Federalist's own posi-
tion is on the whole unsympathetic to the importance of the states." D. EPSTEIN, supra note 62, at 54.
As Charles Black points out, "In [McCulloch], perhaps the greatest of our constitutional cases, judg-
ment is reached not fundamentally on the basis of that kind of textual exegesis which we tend to regard
as normal, but on the basis of reasoning from the total structure which the text has created." C.
BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15 (1969).
79. 17 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 316, 404 (1819). Probably it was no accident that in his Gettysburg address,
Abraham Lincoln echoed and improved upon Marshall's cadence in McCulloch, in which Marshall
declared the United States to be a government "of the people .. from the people ... and for their
benefit," id. at 403. Lincoln also believed - and fought a war to confirm - that the Federal govern-
ment "could not be negatived, by the State governments." Id. at 405.
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McReynolds quoted at length in his Steward Machine Co. v. Davis dis-
sent.8 0 McReynolds bitterly asserted there that Congress had no
spending power authority to establish the Social Security system.
Ironically, the centerpiece of President Reagan's First Inaugural Ad-
dress was an almost verbatim, albeit inadvertent, quotation of Pierce."1
The current states' rights theory undoubtedly follows a long and
familiar tradition, at least as old as Anti-Federalist opposition to ratifi-
cation of the Constitution. In 1798, Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison adopted a rather extreme states' rights doctrine when they
attacked the Alien and Sedition Acts and even hinted at nullification
by the states.8 2 John C. Calhoun continued and expanded this tradi-
tion with his state nullification theory in the 1830s.8 3 States' rights
also figured prominently in antislavery rhetoric as well as in southern
secessionist action. 4
What is probably less familiar, however, is the idea that constitu-
tional ideas about federalism have changed over time, a phenomenon
Madison specifically anticipated and celebrated in Federalist No. 46.85
80. In a veto message sent to the Senate on May 3, 1854, Pierce - whom McReynolds described
in his dissenting opinion in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 598-609 (1937) as "a scholarly
lawyer of distinction [who] enjoyed the advice and counsel of a rarely able Attorney General - Caleb
Cushing of Massachusetts," id. at 600 - argued that Congress lacked power to grant public lands to
the states for the benefit of the indigent insane. Pierce asked: "Are we not too prone to forget that the
Federal Union is the creature of the States, not they of the Federal Union?" MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF
THE PRESIDENTS 249 (J. Richardson ed. 1903).
81. President Reagan emphasized in his first Inaugural Address, "[aill of us - all of us need to be
reminded that the Federal Government did not create the states; the states created the Federal Govern-
ment." N. Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1981, at BI, col. 1. But see Administration Submits Plan to Reduce
Damage Awards, N.Y. Times, May 1, 1986, at B9, col. 1; Reagan Aides Draft Bill to Pre-Empt States
Product-Liability Laws, N.Y. Times, April 21, 1986, at B9, col. 1.
82. The intricate history of the secret authorship and circulation by Thomas Jefferson of the
Kentucky Resolutions and by James Madison of the more moderate Virginia Resolutions is explored in
Koch & Ammon, The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions: An Episode in Jefferson's and Madison's
Defense of Civil Liberties, 5 WM. & MARY Q. 145 (3rd Ser., 1948) (including an Editor's Note taking
"special pleasure in publishing this article" at a time of "fierce political controversy now raging within
the Democratic Party," id. at 145, because Virginia's Senator Byrd and Governor Tuck sought to leave
the names of Harry Truman and Henry Wallace off the 1948 presidential ballot because of the Presi-
dent's commitment to eliminating Jim Crow). See also A. KocH, JEFFERSON & MADISON: THE
GREAT COLLABORATION 174-211 (1964). Adrienne Koch demonstrated that Madison adopted a
much milder tone than that in Jefferson's initial draft, which argued for state nullification, and she
claimed that Madison's "last years were wholly absorbed in defending the Union." A. KOCH,
MADISON'S "ADVICE TO MY COUNTRY" 132 (1966).
83. A snappy review of the nullification controversy may be found in R. REMINi, 3 ANDREW
JACKSON AND THE COURSE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, 1833-1845, 8-44 (1984), in which Jackson
sounds remarkably like Joseph Story. See supra note 71 and infra note 116.
84. For example, the Personal Liberty Law passed by Massachusetts in 1855 declared the Federal
Fugitive Slave Law to be "a direct violation of the Xth Amendment," S. CAMPBELL, THE SLAVE
CATCHERS: ENFORCEMENT OF THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW, 1850-1860 (1968). See also the antislav-
ery cases which culminated in Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 517-22 (1859).
85. Madison wrote, "[b]eyond doubt.., the first and most natural attachment of the people will
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Many wise lawyers have failed, like Justice Powell, to recognize that
the Civil War and the amendments passed in its wake had something
to say about state sovereignty. I am thinking, for example, of Justice
Black's reliance on "the dreams of the Founders" as a grounding for
the metaconstitutional doctrine of Our Federalism in Younger v. Har-
ris.86 Many forget, as Justice Rehnquist tried to remind his audience
at the University of Missouri several years ago, that:
The original Constitution was adopted not to enshrine states'
rights or to guarantee individual freedom, but to create a limited
national government which was empowered to curtail both states'
rights and individual freedom. 8
7
Justice Rehnquist insisted that "the final answer to the question of
states' rights as opposed to the authority of the national government
was solved, not by philosophers or debaters, but by the brave soldiers
on both sides who fought the Civil War."88
A. The Process of Constitutional Amendment
Even if we were to assume that the tenth amendment authorizes
judicial intervention, the pattern of later constitutional amendments
by the people is overwhelmingly against state sovereignty and tends
toward increased federal control. With the exception of the eleventh
amendment, an altogether muddy response to a lawyers' problem
about federal court jurisdiction, 89 and the twenty-first, which restored
regulation of intoxicating beverages to the states, the amendments es-
tablish a clear pattern.
In three clusters of amendments, each over the course of approxi-
mately one decade, the people formally changed the Constitution to
grant additional powers to Congress. Each time, after a lull of several
years, federal judges responded to the new amendments with interpre-
tations of the Constitution as a repository of states' rights. They could
easily find resonance in the oratory of George Wharton Pepper who,
in his argument in United States v. Butler, warned of a time when "the
general welfare clause gone mad" would compel "replacement of the
be to the governments of the respective states," but Madison emphasized that if the situation changed,
"the people ought not surely to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where they may
discern it to be most due."
86. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
87. Rehnquist, Government By Clichd, 45 Mo. L. REV. 379, 387 (1980) (emphasis in original).
88. Id. at 388. But see, e.g., Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S 100
(1981); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
89. See supra note 41 for sources on the history of the eleventh amendment and infra notes 128-
130 for a discussion of the current Court's ahistorical attitudes about it.
[Vol. 57
1986] TRUISMS: TENTH AMENDMENT, SPENDING POWER 815
land of the free" with "the land of the regimented." 9°
There is a dialectic in judicial perceptions of federal-state rela-
tions which mirrors the dialectic in questions of federal and state court
jurisdiction. But the direction of the amendment process is more like
a straight line, pointing toward an ever-increasing sense of national
interdependence and enhancement of federal governmental power.
This movement can be better understood by looking at the three clus-
ters of amendments themselves, rather than at judicial pronounce-
ments about them.
1. The First Cluster: Civil War Amendments
The first cluster of amendments was ratified in the wake of the
Civil War. The thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments dra-
matically rejected states' rights claims, relied upon before the war by
what the victors called the Slave Power. With enthusiasm, the men of
the 39th Congress and their immediate successors invoked in support
of the amendments decisions such as Prigg v. Pennsylvania,9  which
had found a constitutional compulsion for federal power to return fu-
gitive slaves from free states to the south. Noting the irony, such
Moderate Republican leaders as Representative James R. Wilson (R.-
Iowa) and Senator Lyman Trumbull (R.-Ill.) joined Radical Republi-
cans such as Representative Thaddeus Stevens (R.-Pa.) and Senator
Charles Sumner (R.-Mass.) in celebrating a radical transformation of
the constitutional scheme. They sought to guarantee the fruits of the
Civil War victory, won at such a gruesome cost, and to bury forever
the constitutionalism that had produced the Dred Scott v. Sanford92
decision and, in their view, had led directly to the outbreak of the war.
Just as federal power in support of slavery had triumphed over
state laws protecting personal freedom in antislavery strongholds such
as Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin, the new amendments
would override states' rights claims when federal protection was neces-
90. 297 U.S. 1, 44 (1936). A summary of George Wharton Pepper's outstanding example of old-
style appellate advocacy may be found beginning at 297 U.S. 1, 23 (1936). For a powerful radio speech
in response to Butler, see Corwin, Curbing the Court, in 2 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 373 (1936). A
survey of the reportage and editorial comment about the Butler decision reveals a surprising propensity
for the rhetoric of class-war and a generally vigorous debate. See, e.g., Lerner, The Divine Right of
Judges, THE NATION 121-23 (January 29, 1936); The Supreme Court Rules, THE NEW REPUBLIC 269-
70 (January 15, 1936); N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1936, at 112-113 (summary of nation's press reactions).
This helps to explain why Butler provoked the first steps toward Roosevelt's Court-packing scheme.
See R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 139 (1941); H. ICKES, THE SECRET
DIARY OF HAROLD L. ICKES: THE FIRST THOUSAND DAYS, 1933-36, 515 (1953).
91. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
92. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). See generally D. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE:
ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS (1978).
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sary to guarantee rights to the newly freed slaves and to all male citi-
zens. Through the enforcement clauses of each of the Civil War
Amendments, and repeatedly in debate and in statutes, the post-Civil
War Congresses sought to nationalize constitutional protection by
compelling the states to provide full and equal protection for basic.
civil and political rights.93 Federal intervention would be forthcoming
should the states fail in their constitutional obligations to guarantee
equal protection.
The Supreme Court quickly began to eviscerate this Second Con-
stitution through bizarrely formalistic and internally inconsistent deci-
sions such as United States v. Cruikshank,94 United States v. Harris,95
and the Civil Rights Cases.96 Yet even in these decisions and those like
them, the Court repeatedly proclaimed that the thirteenth, fourteenth
and fifteenth amendments were intended to guarantee "additional
powers to the federal government; additional restraints upon those of
the states."9"
In the context of such a gap between an acknowledged broad pur-
pose and a remarkably crabbed application, the seesaw fallacy of the
"conservation of historical energy" lies in the assumption that an in-
crease in federal power automatically implies a decrease in state
power. The basic presumption in these Civil War amendments was
that the states were newly obliged to exercise their power to protect
civil rights and that now the power of the federal government was
increased sufficiently to intervene if the states failed in their duty. Un-
fortunately, instead of recognizing this relatively clear example of an
original understanding, the seesaw fallacy is commonly employed in-
stead. This approach is both illogical and fundamental to the typical
debate about American federalism. That the immediate post-Civil
War Amendments altered the constitutional scheme - and were in-
tended to allow increased power to Congress to reach areas not previ-
ously within its grasp when necessary - is as certain as anything can
be in constitutional history. For a variety of tangled reasons, however,
the Court and most of the nation were anxious to forget the suffering
of the Civil War and to return to a new normalcy; they tended to
reach back to antebellum notions and to recast them as bulwarks to
use against congressional efforts to protect the civil rights of all
93. For a review of the historical literature and a detailed discussion, see, for example, H. HYMAN
& W. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875 (1982);
Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651 (1979).
94. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
95. 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
96. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
97. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 67-68 (1873).
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citizens.98
The constitutional revolution that accompanied the bloody reso-
lution of the federalism. debate between 1861-1865 was almost entirely
abrogated by the attack launched by the Supreme Court against con-
gressional power. Before the Civil War, only two federal statutes and
a handful of state statutes had been declared unconstitutional, but dur-
ing the Gilded Age the Court began to play an aggressive intervention-
ist role. Statute after statute - state and federal - fell before the
judges' new theories about the appropriate limits of dual sovereignty. 99
Reliance on a formal theory about governmental power and fed-
eralism dominated constitutional law from approximately 1870 until
1937. It was not until Franklin Delano Roosevelt lost the battle to
pack the Court but won the war to reconstruct it that dual sovereignty
died the death ordained by the Civil War. A plausible explanation for
the staying power of the dual sovereignty concept was its utility as a
whipsaw against any legislation judges disliked at any level of govern-
ment. Neither federal nor state attempts to regulate corporations, for
example, could survive the judges' fixed-pie approach to federalism.
Legislative control over child labor and anti-union practices fell fre-
quently. These popular innovations were held to be beyond the proper
scope of federal legislation. Yet they were also held not to be within
the constitutional power of state legislatures. Substantive due process
doctrines, and other federal and state constitutional weapons such as
the contract clause, established a twilight zone entirely free from legal
regulation.
Three well-known 1895 decisions underscore the difficulties in the
dual sovereignty approach by exemplifying the lack of principle in at-
tempts to apply a simple "either/or" approach to the complex rela-
98. Those who invoked the Civil War amendments confronted several basic conflicts that dated
from the time of the initial constitutional compromises and were exacerbated by westward expansion,
nationalism, and political changes. The thirteenth amendment, for example, simply declared away the
constitutional argument that slaves were property, protected from any federal taking unless due process
and just compensation were forthcoming.
Considered as a unit, the Civil War amendments chopped through the tangle of states' rights
arguments and limitations upon the power of Congress exemplified by the Dred Scott decision. Yet
most judges interpreted constitutional and statutory changes as if bound by antebellum precedents and
attitudes. This legal response is, in fact, a major aspect of the Reconstruction tragedy. The obvious sea
change in federalism produced by the Civil War failed to alter basic judicial perceptions, despite the
intentions of most framers and ratifiers of the new constitutional order. I explored these themes in a
paper, Forty Acres, Forty Years: Constitution and Contract Law after Slavery, presented at the 1981
Annual Meeting of the Organization of American Historians (on file with the University of Colorado
Law Review).
99. See generally L. BETH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, 1877-1917
(1971); B. TWiSS, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: How LAISSEZ FAIRE CAME TO THE SUPREME
COURT (1942); E. Corwin, supra note I; Hamilton, Freedom of Contract, 5 ENCY. OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 450 (1931).
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tionships of the modem world: United States v. E. C Knight Co., 100 In
re Debs,'t ' and Chief Justice Fuller's decision on rehearing in Pollock
v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,1 °2 which invalidated the income tax.
Chief Justice Hughes later identified this last decision, replete with its
explicit statements against allowing redistribution of wealth, as one of
the Supreme Court's three "self-inflicted wounds."103
2. The Second Cluster: World War I
The heated popular response to Pollock culminated in a rare over-
turning of a pronouncement by the Court about constitutional law in
the enactment and ratification of the sixteenth amendment in 1913.
This amendment transferred a tremendous amount of power to the
federal government; indeed, most Americans would claim that it pro-
vided Congress with virtually limitless authority to tax.' °4
The sixteenth amendment was only the opening salvo in the sec-
ond cluster of amendments surrounding World War I that further lim-
100. 156 U.S. 1 (1895). Chief Justice Fuller determined that, although the Sugar Trust monopo-
lized ninety-eight percent of the country's sugar refining, Congress could not reach it under the Sher-
man Act. Because the Trust was engaged in manufacturing but not in commerce, it could be regulated
only by the states; federal authority simply did not extend to manufacturing.
101. 158 U.S. 564 (1895). In re Debs was a most paradoxical decision by the strong believers in
states' rights who dominated the Court. Justice David Brewer, writing for a unanimous Court, upheld
the inherent power of President Grover Cleveland and Attorney General Richard B. Olney to use the
equitable powers of the federal courts to halt the actions of the leaders of the huge Pullman railroad
strike. Despite the absence of statutory authority, Brewer held, the federal government's inherent
power to act for the general welfare was sufficient to sustain intervention by federal courts and federal
troops, even over the objections of Illinois Governor John Peter Altgeld and other state officials. See
generally R. GINGER, ALTGELD'S AMERICA: THE LINCOLN IDEAL VERSUS CHANGING REALITIES
(1958).
102. 158 U.S. 601 (1895). For a discussion of Chief Justice Fuller's decision, see W. KING, MEL-
VILLE WESTON FULLER: CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1888-1910, 193-221 (1950). In the
1894 Term, there were no facts more dramatic than those surrounding the Debs case, but the most
dramatic legal argument was made by Joseph Choate as part of the constitutional assault on the federal
income tax in Pollock. A summary of Choate's famous argument is available at 157 U.S. 532 (1895).
Choate proclaimed: "The Act ... is communistic in its purposes and tendencies, and is defended here
upon principles as communistic, socialistic - what shall I call them - populistic as ever have been
addressed to any political assembly in the world." Id. at 532. Choate warned the Justices: "There is
protection now or never .... You cannot hereafter exercise any check if you now say that Congress is
untrammelled and uncontrollable." Id. at 533.
For a discussion of the Debs case, and of the 1895 Term in its legal and political context, see A.
PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW (1960).
103. The other decisions Hughes listed in the book he wrote between his two stints on the
Supreme Court, C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1928), were the Dred
Scott decision and the Court's quick switch in the legal tender cases after the Civil War.
104. Apparently, there was little recognition and hardly any discussion of the implications for
federal-state relations in the debates over the sixteenth amendment and the ratificaton process, which
were analyzed by a student of mine, Steve Lincoln, and discussed in his paper, Ratification of the
Sixteenth Amendment. Theories of State Approval (on file with the University of Colorado Law
Review).
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ited the power of the states. In 1913, the seventeenth amendment
changed the process of electing United States Senators by taking that
franchise away from state legislatures and assigning it directly to the
voters themselves. (This accomplished what Madison had urged at
the Constitutional Convention.) In 1919, state and local options were
overridden again in the nationalization of the Prohibition experiment
by the eighteenth amendment. Finally, the right of women to vote was
nationalized by the nineteenth amendment in 1920. This amendment
contained a clause taken from the Civil War Amendments, which gave
Congress additional, undefined power to enforce suffrage
guarantees. 105
3. The Third Cluster: The 1960s
After the repeal of Prohibition and several housekeeping changes
concerning the Presidency, the final flurry of constitutional amend-
ments occurred in the decade from 1961-1971. With the exception of
the twenty-fifth amendment, which was ratified in 1967 and altered
the line of presidential succession, the amendments in this third group
continued the pattern of increased deference to and reliance upon con-
gressional power. The twenty-third amendment gave presidential elec-
tors to the District of Columbia, thereby diminishing slightly the
power of existing state electors. More substantial limitations occurred
when the twenty-fourth amendment eliminated the poll tax in federal
elections in 1964 and the twenty-sixth amendment guaranteed eight-
een-year-olds the right to vote in 1971. Not only did all these amend-
ments constrict state sovereignty, but they all contained the now
standard clause assigning enforcement power to Congress. In fact,
they dealt with and limited the ability of states to control the franchise
- surely a fundamental attribute of sovereignty - and to preserve the
political impact of the states in national elections. 106
105. There was limited official judicial resistance to the first of these two amendments, but the
nineteenth amendment frequently met with substantial narrowing constructions, and yet also was in-
voked with almost gleeful irony. For example, a number of courts quickly determined that affording
suffrage to women did not extend to them general civic rights and duties such as jury service or equality
in qualifying for licenses. At the same time, the Supreme Court invoked the new suffrage amendment
to argue in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 553 (1923) that legislation setting minimum
wages for women in the District of Columbia was unconstitutional since, with suffrage, the civil inferi-
ority of women had reached the "vanishing point." See, e.g., In re Opinion of the Justices, 237 Mass.
591, 130 N.E. 685 (1921); Commonwealth v. Welosky, 275 Mass. 398, 177 N.E. 656 (1931), cert.
denied, 284 U.S. 684 (1932); Palfrey, The Eligibility of Women for Public Office under the Constitution
of Massachusetts, 7 MASS. L.Q. 147 (1922); Note, The Current Controversy About Juries, 8 MASS. L.Q.
31 (1923). But see State v. Chase, 106 Or. 263, 211 P. 920 (1922). See generally Weisbrod, Images of
the Woman Juror, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 50 (1986).
106. We lack a coherent, consistent theory of representation. There is no generally acknowledged
standard - constitutional or otherwise - that determines whether state government, a national
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The point of this brief review of the movement in constitutional
amendments toward centralization is certainly not that all or even
most Americans have abandoned their traditional reliance upon state
government, or their belief in state autonomy. On the contrary, states'
rights arguments remain sufficiently powerful that we resort to the
constitutional amendment process when we want formal alteration of
the status quo of federalism. Nevertheless, the unmistakable thrust of
changes in the constitutional text has been toward increased power in
the Congress and toward expansion of a direct, national role for the
electorate.
III. THE SPENDING POWER UNCHAINED: THE TENTH
AMENDMENT UNBOUNDED
United States v. Butler"°7 is probably the best illustration we have
of the inherent difficulties in establishing constitutional limitations
within the spending power. This decision represents the last and best-
known application of a constitutional theory of structural restraint on
congressional power to spend for the general welfare. It also demon-
strates the range of political issues and emotions that surround Con-
gress' use of the federal purse to induce or coerce conduct.
Butler, which invalidated President Roosevelt's Agricultural Ad-
justment Act ("AAA"), involved a challenge to congressional power
to tax those who processed farm products, to provide revenue to subsi-
dize those farmers who agreed to reduce their crop production. o8 The
party actually before the Court was William M. Butler, who appeared
as the president and receiver for the Hoosac Mills Corporation.
clearinghouse, or some local or alternative governmental form best serves liberty and equality, guaran-
tees majoritarian control and protection of minorities, and reflects the people's will but is not captured
by special interests. For an admirable attempt at application of representation ideals in constitutional
law, see J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). In contrast to its consideration of cases perceived
to be within the tenth amendment category, the Court generally has been willing to uphold quite expan-
sive congressional power over state regulation of the franchise. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States,
446 U.S. 156 (1980); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). Butsee Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
112 (1970).
107. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
108. The Agricultural Adjustment Act, 48 Stat. 31 (1933) (hereinafter AAA), was premised on
the idea that the prices paid to farmers for their agricultural products should provide them with parity
in purchasing power to what they had had in a base period designated as 1909-1914 for farm products
other than potatoes and tobacco. To reach parity, the Act gave Secretary of Agriculture Henry A.
Wallace tremendous discretion to provide for reduction in average yield or in the supply of particular
farm commodities. The processing tax created in § 9 also was premised on the 1909-1914 base period,
and sought to make up the difference between that rate, which was termed the "fair exchange value of
the commodity," and the then-current average market price. Like the National Industrial Recovery
Act invalidated in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), the AAA relied on
marketing agreements and is an example of the corporatist strand in New Deal policy. See generally P.
IRONS, THE NEw DEAL LAWYERS (1982).
[Vol. 57
1986] TRUISMS: TENTH AMENDMENT, SPENDING POWER 821
Cloaked in the rough garb of a Jeffersonian yeoman, Butler actually
was a leading Republican businessman.109 Not only had Butler
briefly been a United States Senator from Massachusetts, but he also
had served as Calvin Coolidge's national presidential campaign man-
ager in 1924. Butler was represented vehemently before the Court by
George Wharton Pepper, of the Philadelphia Wharton and Pepper
families, who had been a United States Senator with Butler during
Coolidge's presidency and who was the quintessential Philadelphia
lawyer. 110
Butler was neatly positioned to force the federal government law-
yers into court to defend a statute they were loath to litigate. He chal-
lenged the government's claim that the Hoosac cotton mill receivers
owed some $80,000 in processing and floor taxes:... Peter Irons, in
impressive fashion, recently ,told the story of how the AAA was
drafted, applied, and defended against challenges -launched by sup-
porters as well as diehard opponents of the New Deal and by lawyers
inside as well as outside Roosevelt's administration." 2 Although
there were a number of relatively limited grounds the Court might
have chosen to invalidate the AAA, 3 Justice Roberts and the major-
109. For biographical data on William M. Butler, see obituary, N.Y. Times, March 30, 1937 at
A-23, col. 1. A graduate of Boston University School of Law and an influential businessman, Butler
was appointed to the United States Senate in November, 1924 to fill out the term of Henry Cabot
Lodge. Butler twice lost attempts to be elected to the Senate himself. See also IRONS, supra note 108, at
320 n.2.
110. For biographical data on George Wharton Pepper, "a very proper Philadelphian... [and]
the unofficial dean of the Philadelphia bar," E. BALTZELL, PURITAN BOSTON AND QUAKER PHILA-
DELPHIA 414 (1979), see obituary, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1961 at A. 37, col. 2. Pepper was appointed to
the United States Senate to fill Boise Penrose's unexpired term but was defeated for re-election. The
Wharton family and its connection to business and the Wharton School is well-known; that there were
real Dr. Peppers and that "they virtually ran the Penn Medical School between the Civil War and
World War II," BALTZELL at 359, is perhaps less well known. George Wharton Pepper wrote a re-
vealing autobiography: G. PEPPER, PHILADELPHIA LAWYER, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 0944).
111. In early 1934 the Agricultural Adjustment Administration was attempting to avoid litigation
as much as possible. Because the federal government claimed that the bankrupt Hoosac Cotton Mills
in North Adams and New Bedford owed $81,694.28 in overdue processing and floor taxes, however,
Butler and his follow receivers were ideally placed "to make it a test case," as their lawyer John W.
Lowrance put it. See P. IRONS, supra note 108, at 182-83. In fact, Irons has developed evidence sug-
gesting that the Boston financier, Frederick Prince, was behind the attempt to use the bankrupt firm as
"a legal Trojan horse," in order to gain revenge or at least bargaining power in his dispute with AAA
officials over their access to the records of Armour & Co., which Prince controlled. Id. at 183.
112. P. IRONS, supra note 108, at 111-199. Irons includes material on Jerome Frank and Frank's
own reverse anti-semitism, as well as illuminating information about young lawyers such as Alger Hiss,
Paul Freund, and Adlai Stevenson. The book is a fine treatment of the turf battles within the New Deal
generally and is quite illuminating about the impact of New Deal farm policy on tenant farmers and
others not party to marketing agreements or lacking in political clout.
113. The decision in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) made the
delegation argument appear particularly dangerous to the lawyers working in the office of Solicitor
General Reed to defend the AAA. Among them was Alger Hiss, who earlier had.resigned in sympathy
for Jerome Frank when Frank was purged from his post as AAA General Counsel in February, 1935.
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ity seized the opportunity to determine the scope of the spending
power and to establish what they hoped would be an impregnable
tenth amendment barrier against that power.
A frequently overlooked facet of the Butler decision is that the
majority did not rely on a limited reading of the spending power, nor
on a limited definition of the general welfare. In its enthusiasm to
resurrect a tenth amendment threatened by several earlier decisions
upholding various governmental interventions in the labor market,
the Court relegated more obvious constitutional claims such as im-
proper delegation, due process, equal protection, and indirect taxation
to a footnote.' 14  Justice Roberts instead plunged directly into the
maelstrom of the perceived clash between competing forces of the
spending power and the tenth amendment. He first determined that
the limited view of the spending power he attributed to Madison
would make article I's grant of the taxing and spending power a "mere
tautology."" 5 To avoid that, Roberts asserted, it was necessary to em-
brace Hamilton and to recognize that Congress possesses powers be-
yond those made explicit elsewhere in the Constitution. Therefore, the
Butler majority summarized: "The power of Congress to authorize
expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the
direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution."' 6
It would be hard to find a more explicit judicial proclamation of
the open-ended reach of the spending power. How, then, did the But-
Hiss, who assumed primary responsibility for drafting the government's brief along with Paul Freund,
told Peter Irons in 1978 that he and his colleagues never liked the processing tax, but tried to stretch
the general welfare clause as far as they could. P. IRONS, supra note 108, at 188-89. With the advice of
Professor Thomas Reed Powell, Hiss and Freund adopted what came to be called the Hamiltonian
position on congressional spending power, traceable to Alexander Hamilton's Report on Manufactures
to the House of Representatives (1791), and his Opinion as to the Constitutionality of the Bank of the
United States. 3 WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 180 (H. Lodge ed. 1885). This position was
summarized and enthusiastically endorsed in J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
§§ 1900-01, 1907-12 (1833), quoted and discussed in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 64 n.11 (1936);
Berns, supra note 46, at 130-45.
114. 297 U.S. 1, 62 n.8 (1936). Id. at 65.
115. The basis for terming this the Madisonian position is not specified. This certainly was not
what Madison said or did in 1787, though there is some support for it in Madison's FEDERALIST No.
41, in contrast to Madison's FEDERALIST No. 14. The best known source for this restrictive view of the
general welfare clause is President Madison's Veto Message of March 3, 1817, in J. RICHARDSON, I
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 584-85 (1899). In this famous message, which Madison
delivered on his final day as President, Madison vetoed an internal improvements bill sponsored, ironi-
cally, by Representative John C. Calhoun, who was "at this stage one of the most thoroughgoing na-
tionalists in the country." Corwin, The Spending Power of Congress - Apropos the Maternity Act, 36
HARV. L. REV. 548, 557 (1923). On other issues during Madison's presidency, such as chartering the
Second Bank of the United States in 1816, Madison was allied with Calhoun in actual practice and
supported implicit national power.
116. 297 U.S. at 65. Roberts, relying heavily on Justice Story's interpretation for his decision,
specifically endorsed what Roberts called "the Hamiltonian position," id. at 64-67.
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ler majority - composed of Chief Justice Hughes and the "Four
Horsemen of Reaction" in addition to Justice Roberts - manage to
find constitutional grounds to invalidate the New Deal farm program?
They said there was no limit, either explicit or implicit, within Article
I's broad grant of powers to Congress; rather, Justice Roberts at-
tempted to draw a constitutional line between "matters of national, as
distinguished from local welfare." '1 17  He asserted that Congress
sought a constitutionally impermissible end in its farm scheme, be-
cause the statute "invades the reserved rights of the states." ' The
ground for this claim remained a bit vague, but its source was the
Court's reading of the tenth amendment to provide that "powers not
granted are prohibited." '19 In addition to Butler being wrong-headed
about the text and intention of the tenth amendment, there are other
significant problems with the use of the tenth amendment as a re-
straint upon federal agricultural programs.
The first difficulty is that, even if one assumes that the tenth
amendment grants or guarantees state sovereignty, the inconsistency
between state sovereignty and a federal agricultural policy is not obvi-
ous. Apparently, the inconsistency was thought to rest on a vague
Aristotelian notion that farming is somehow naturally a matter left
exclusively to the states. Earlier cases that involved both vicious com-
petition among the states to protect their own dairy farmers and the
failure of state programs to deal with issues such as child labor and
plummeting prices had demonstrated rather powerfully that this ap-
proach to federalism was inconsistent with the reality of economic in-
terdependence put into stark relief by the Depression.1 20  But the
Butler majority retreated to the familiar terrain of judicial fiat. With-
out citation, but with much vivid embroidery supplied by slippery
slope arguments, Justice Roberts declared, "contracts for the reduc-
tion of acreage and the control of production are outside the range of
that [federal] power." 121
The second major difficulty in Butler is that the federal program
117. Id. at 67.
118. Id. at 68.
119. Id. Justice Roberts was willing to acknowledge national government powers "reasonably to
be implied from such as are conferred," id., and purported to indulge every presumption in favor of the
constitutionality of congressional action. Id. at 67.
120. Compare, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Home Building & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923) with, e.g., Hammer
v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); The Child Labor Tax Case (Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.], 259
U.S. 20 (1922); Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
121. 297 U.S. at 73. Almost surely the pun was unintended when Roberts asked the rhetorical
question: "Is a statute less objectionable which authorizes expenditure of federal moneys to induce
action in a field in which the United States has no power to intermeddle?" Id.
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involved only voluntary participation by farmers. Nevertheless, the
majority believed that sufficient "coercion by economic pressure" was
involved to render the "asserted power of choice ... illusory."' 22 The
implications of this argument - if the idea that consent is illusory
when based upon financial necessity were applied, for example, to la-
bor relations - seemed not to occur to the Butler majority. It would
have turned upside down the liberty of contract-substantive due pro-
cess ideals fundamental to Justices McReynolds, Van Devanter, But-
ler, and Sutherland to encourage judicial scrutiny of voluntary
agreements that only appeared to rest on consent. Judicial review of
virtually all state as well as federal government programs might
follow.
Yet the coercion theme in Butler remains appealing. It is clearly
relevant to contemporary attacks on governmental carrots and sticks
and is useful in challenging a variety of conditions attached to govern-
ment benefits. That approach makes sense when applied to cases of
unconstitutional conditions for individuals. 23 Hamilton himself as-
serted in Federalist No. 79: "In the general course of human nature, a
power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will."' 24
There is no textual basis in the Constitution for this economic ap-
proach to coercion, however, except possibly the thirteenth amend-
ment. That amendment, which abolished involuntary servitude as
well as slavery, is generally construed quite narrowly on matters of
financial coercion. 125 Yet we lack any clear means to distinguish con-
122. Id. at 71. George Wharton Pepper attacked the image of "the farmer ... placed on the
auction block ... [who] sells his freedom for this mess of pottage," id. at 34.
123. This is not to say that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions as we know it today is
satisfactory or even coherent. See, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto
Rico, 106 S. Ct. 2968 (1986). Rather it is to deny that one of Holmes's favorite postulates - that the
greater power necessarily includes the lesser - should be as prevalent in legal discourse as it still seems
to be. Such reasoning, after all, served nicely as a primary justification for slavery, defended as an
exercise of the lesser power than the power to kill one's captives. See generally D. DAVIS, THE PROB-
LEM OF SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE (1966); Howe, The Positivism of Mr. Justice Holmes, 64
HARV. L. REV. 529, 536-38 (1951); Touster, Book Review, 76 HARV. L. REV. 430 (1962) (reviewing E.
WILSON, PATRIOTIC GORE: STUDIES IN THE LITERATURE OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR (1962).
The locus classicus for modem judicial rejection of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is
Holmes's opinion in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
124. (Emphasis in original.) This was quoted by Chief Justice Burger in his unanimous opinion
in United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980). For a more detailed examination of the concept, and
its use and abuse by judges around the end of the nineteenth century, see Soifer, The Paradox of Pater-
nalism: The United States Supreme Court and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1888-1921, forthcoming
in CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY: POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY (W. Samuels & A. Miller eds. 1986).
Alexander Hamilton seemed to state the obvious in Federalist No. 22, in which he ridiculed the "enor-
mous doctrine of a right of (State) legislative repeal" and emphasized the absurdity of the idea that "a
party to a compact has a right to revoke that compact."
125. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905);
United States v. Choctaw Nation, 193 U.S. 115 (1904); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897). But
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sent obtained out of necessity from consent obtained out of ambition
or greed. The volunteer army is a good example of the problem.
What, if any, judicial scrutiny of enlistments by unemployed black
teenagers, for example, is desirable or constitutionally compelled?
In any event, the third problem in Butler is that the coercion doc-
trine simply has no place in matters involving the states qua states.
This is not to deny the pervasive use of federal dollars, taxes, or tax
exemptions to channel or cabin individual actions today. Nor is it to
reject efforts to control manipulation of individuals by the almighty
federal dollar, or at least to guarantee better feedback about and con-
trol of the federal bureaucracy. But there is no constitutional basis for
the broadening Supreme Court attacks on federal funding schemes
which purportedly coerce or purchase the consent of states. Couched
in the language of statutory construction, with a patina of protective
constitutional coloration, this trend departs entirely from modem pre-
cedent and longstanding practice.126 It is nevertheless now clear that a
majority of the Court believes that "[t]he legitimacy of Congress'
power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether the
State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the
'contract.' ",127
see Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911), over a harsh Holmes dissent in which he proclaimed, "[t]he
Thirteenth Amendment does not outlaw contracts for labor." Id. at 246.
126. See, e.g., Green v. Mansour, 106 S. Ct. 423 (1985); Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,
105 S. Ct. 3142 (1985); Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984); Pen-
nhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
127. Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). This decision, based ultimately
on the Court's narrow statutory reading of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights
Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 6000-6081, is a remarkable example of the application of the ideology of
freely-willed contract law to intergovernmental relations, reminiscent of John C. Calhoun's theories
during his secessionist phase. For example, Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion seeks to determine
"whether Congress spoke so clearly that we can fairly say that the State could make an informed
choice." 451 U.S. at 25. (Rehnquist does not specify which or how many state officials this test re-
quires nor does he suggest what would actually constitute informed consent by a state). The state's
consent, he argues, should be considered to be "much in the nature of a contract." Id. at 17. Unfortu-
nately, putting weight on the concept of the state of mind of a state is a vivid example of the power of a
metaphor to conceal rather than reveal what is being discussed.
Scrupulous concern for consent by a state contrasts starkly with decisions by the Court enforcing
contracts against individuals, despite severely restricted or non-existent alternatives. The tone of Justice
Rehnquist's entire opinion is that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania could or should not have made
such a bad bargain with the federal government as actually to obligate itself to guarantee the Bill of
Rights for the Disabled that Congress promulgated. Compare this solicitude for the state - this insis-
tence that the entities of states "exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their
participation," id. - with, for example, the Court's demonstration of little concern for the knowing
and voluntary quality of the bargain when it determined that a welfare recipient could be required to
accept the intrusion of a home visit as a condition of her acceptance of welfare benefits. In the words of
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 324 (1971): "Mrs. James
has the 'right' to refuse the home visit, but a consequence in the form of cessation of aid ... flows from
that refusal. The choice is entirely hers, and nothing of constitutional magnitude is involved." See also
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This statement may be dictum, but its potential impact is vast and
it articulates a standard which contrasts sharply with the view of ear-
lier courts, including some of those most dedicated to dual sover-
eignty. As Edward Corwin put it in his detailed, yet marvelously crisp
article published in anticipation of the challenge by Massachusetts to
the Maternity Act of 1921:
The scruples raised against such cooperation in the name of state
autonomy tend rather to withdraw from the states what must often
prove a most advantageous mode of exercising that autonomy.
Reversing the scriptural text, they would save the ghost of state
sovereignty by suspending its ineffectual body at the end of a chain
of fine-spun legalism.
12 8
Corwin was able to demonstrate persuasively, even at the time of
the Harding administration, that "any attempt to apply the Madis-
onian test to national expenditures today would call for a radical revi-
sion in the customary annual budget of the government and for a
revolution in national administration." 1 29  Needless to say, Congress
had not then even begun to imagine that it had to rely on section five
of the fourteenth amendment as its constitutional basis for such estab-
lished practice. Today Congress apparently would be required to de-
clare its civil rights enforcement purpose to pass the Court's new
constititutional test. Otherwise, if a statute involves state consent to
conditions imposed in exchange for federal funding, Congress must
seek state consent unequivocally, within the four corners of the
statute. 130
Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978) (unconstitutional for Minnesota to alter
pension obligations of employers: workers could have bargained to have pensions vest at the end of 10
years; since they did not, it was an impairment of the obligation of contract to do the equivalent for
them by statute); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1980)(16 1/2-year-old who asked for probation
officer instead of lawyer knowingly and voluntarily waived Miranda rights when he later tearfully con-
fessed to murder while in custody of several police officers).
128. Corwin, supra note 1, at 582.
129. Id. at 579. Corwin's survey of both practice and official proclamations over nearly 150 years,
conducted even before the heyday of what we have come to think of as the Big Bad Brother of national
government, demonstrated that only between 1845 and 1860 was the Madisonian doctrine of limiting
Congress' power to spend to those powers explicit elsewhere in the Constitution "at all generally ac-
cepted." Id. Corwin concluded that, so far as the power to spend is concerned, "the 'general welfare' is
what Congress finds it to be." Id. at 580.
130. Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142 (1985) is particularly instructive. At
first glance, the case seems a curious one for the Court to have decided to grant certiorari and its result
seems largely explainable in terms of attorneys' errors: why would anyone ask for trouble by suing only
the State of California after Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979) and the eleventh amendment deci-
sions discussed supra, note 29? On closer scrutiny, however, Justice Powell's majority opinion is quite
significant beyond its reiteration of recent eleventh amendment doctrine. First, that opinion vividly
demonstrates the Court's new and selective approach to sources of congressional power by rejecting the
Ninth Circuit's view that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was based on Congress' power under section
five of the fourteenth amendment. Since the lower court focused on whether or not the state consented,
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That this rigid contractual approach to the spending power marks
a significant departure from past judicial precedents is illustrated by
the Court's response to the attack on the Maternity Act. In the course
of denying standing to Massachusetts and to Mrs. Frothingham, Jus-
tice Sutherland wrote for a unanimous Court: "Probably, it would be
sufficient to point out that the powers of the State are not invaded,
since the statute imposes no obligation but simply extends an option
which the State is free to accept or reject." '13 1 The entire Supreme
Court in 1923 could not be considered insensitive to claims of liberty
of contract or states' rights. 132  Still, when Massachusetts made the
"naked contention that Congress has usurped the reserved powers of
the several States by the mere enactment of the statute, though noth-
ing has been done and nothing is to be done without their consent," it
was "plain that that question . . . is political and not judicial in
character."1
33
Despite Massachusetts v. Mellon, and in terms perhaps meant to
echo McCulloch v. Maryland ironically, the Butler majority warned
that "power to confer or withhold unlimited benefits is the power to
coerce or destroy."' 34 Discerning a "coercive purpose," the Butler
Court decided that "coercion by economic pressure" could not be
squared with the Constitution.
35
The following year, however, in response to state attacks on al-
leged coercion or purchase of their consent to take part in the Social
Security system, Justice Cardozo returned to the Massachusetts v. Mel-
lon approach. Writing for the majority in Steward Machine Co. v. Da-
vis, he rejected the states' rights claims with language at least as stark
as that Justice Sutherland had used:
[To] hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion is to
plunge the law in endless difficulties. The outcome of such a doc-
trine is the acceptance of a philosophical determinism by which
choice becomes impossible. Till now the law has been guided by a
robust common sense which assumes the freedom of the will as a
according to Justice Powell, the case should be analyzed in terms of the spending power, 105 S. Ct. at
3149-50 n.5. That categorization exercise completed, Justice Powell proceeds to hold that "Congress
must express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable language in the statute
itself." Id. at 3148. The fact that California's Constitution appeared to waive sovereign immunity was
held to be not stated with sufficient clarity to satisfy the majority's eleventh amendment concerns, id. at
3147, nor did the majority accept California's concession below that Congress had passed the Rehabili-
tation Act pursuant to section five of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 3149 n.4.
131. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 480 (1923).
132. See generally F. FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT (1938);
E. CORWIN, supra note 1.
133. 262 U.S. at 483.
134. 297 U.S. at 71.
135. Id.
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working hypothesis in the solution of its problems.' 36
With the current Court, however, the same challenge raised by a
state would get a more sympathetic response. Recently, the Court re-
iterated its view that the eleventh amendment cuts a large chunk out
of Article 111.137 Yet Congress somehow retains the constitutional au-
thority to restore power to the federal courts when Congress presses
precisely the right button. The Court never has made entirely clear
why a constitutional decision should turn on what particular source
for its authority Congress expressly invokes. Moreover, the Court's
curious flip of the search for motive, otherwise much in vogue when
fundamental individual rights are at stake, threatens innumerable stat-
utes passed before the Court began to instruct Congress about how the
right shibboleth, used to identify the source of its power, would make
all the constitutional difference.1 38
136. 301 U.S. 548, 589-90 (1937). During the 1930s, Justice Cardozo probably was the leading
judicial exponent of the view that economic and social problems were national in scope and should be
approached as questions of degree - which he considered to be in the manner of the laws of physics -
rather than with neatly compartmentalized rules. See, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511
(1935) (dormant commerce clause invalidation of state parochialism in dairy industry); Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 327 (1936) (dissenting from Justice Sutherland's majority opinion invalidating
federal regulation of maximum hours and minimum wages in coal mines). In Steward Machine Co.
itself, Justice Cardozo derided the idea of the surrender of state sovereignty, claiming that since a state
could withdraw its consent, "[tio find state destruction there is to find it almost anywhere." 301 U.S. at
596. Concern over the loss of essential powers of statehood, according to Justice Cardozo, "dissolves in
thinnest air when . ..conceived of as dependent upon a statutory consent." Id. at 597. See also
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (upholding the Social Security old age benefits system on the
basis of spending power). There Justice Cardozo wrote: "When money is spent to promote the general
welfare, the concept of welfare or the opposite is shaped by Congress, not the states. So the concept be
not arbitrary, the locality must yield." Id. at 645.
The extent of the transformation within the Court and of acceptance of Cardozo's organic theory
of interconnectedness is probably best demonstrated by Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act of 1938 could reach and penalize a surplus of 239 bushels of wheat grown for
home consumption by owner of a small Ohio farm). The tenth amendment approach used in Butler
was abrogated in U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938),
though Butler itself has never been formally overruled.
137. Green v. Mansour, 106 S. Ct. 423, 425 (1985).
138. For a discussion of the rise of the idea of requiring proof of bad motive in the context of civil
rights, see Soifer, Complacency and Constitutional Law, 42 OHIO ST. L. J. 383, 393-410 (1981). Rogers
v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) indicated that not all my dire predictions have come true, but the Court
continues generally to require rather complete proof of bad motive even in cases of racial discrimina-
tion. See, e.g., Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981); Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. of Education,
458 U.S. 527 (1982); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Education, 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986). Additionally, the
Court has not indicated how the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, will fare under the Court's new
divide-and-conquer approach to the intent behind congressional power, see excerpts from Senate Com-
mittee Hearings and comments in G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
159-64 (1 1th ed. 1985), nor what will follow when judges review either mixed signals from Congress
about the particular source of its constitutional power or boilerplate language adopted to try to estab-
lish the strongest possible constitutional basis for statutes, such as a virtually pretextual citation by the
relevant congressional committees of section five of the fourteenth amendment.
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As a final matter, it is obvious that the Butler majority evaded the
problem of drawing coherent lines to limit federal power. Ironically,
despite its states' rights holding, the Butler decision actually painted
the Court into a corner by adopting the Hamiltonian interpretation of
the spending power. The Court responded to this dilemma which it
created for itself by invoking an extreme version of a slippery-slope
argument: if upheld in Butler, Justice Roberts claimed, the spending
power would become "[t]he instrument of the total subversion of the
governmental powers reserved to the individual states." '139 Unless the
tenth amendment were a constitutional barrier, the Court proclaimed
in language quite similar to Justice Powell's lament in his Garcia dis-
sent, the Constitution would be "subverted."'' Indeed, Justice Rob-
erts declared, "the independence of the individual states [would be]
obliterated, and the United States converted into a central government
exercising uncontrolled police power in every state of the Union, su-
perseding all local control or regulation of the affairs or concerns of
the states." ''
In his well-known dissent in Butler, Justice Stone warned against
judicial intervention that confuses the wisdom of congressional legisla-
tion with the power of Congress to enact such legislative policy. He
also emphasized the long history of federal interventions, premised on
the spending power, that were accompanied by specific conditions
such as the Morrill Act, which required that agricultural science be
taught in land grant universities.'42 He argued that Congress legiti-
mately could consider depressed conditions for farmers to be a na-
tional concern and could reasonably enact national legislation.
Justice Stone went on to claim that while the federal govern-
ment's power of the purse is great, it is not unrestrained. By stating
that Congress has "power to impose conditions reasonably adapted to
the attainment of the end"' 43 invoked to justify the expenditure, Jus-
tice Stone suggested that potential judicial scrutiny should remain.
Apparently, however, he would only invoke the traditional, extremely
deferential mode of judicial consideration limited to whether legisla-
139. 297 U.S. at 75.
140. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. Justice Roberts, like Justice Powell, couched his
argument in the vague terms of the absence of evidence of a suggestion by the framers of a willingness
to see the Constitution subverted, the states destroyed, and the national government exercising uncon-
trolled power. The failure to find such suggestions seems neither a great surprise nor probative of much
of anything.
141. 297 U.S. at 77. To decide otherwise, Roberts wrote, would "inevitably lead" to the destruc-
tion of local self-government in the states. Id. at 77-78.
142. Id. at 83.
143. Id. at 85.
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tive means were rationally related to legitimate ends. 14"
In his Butler dissent, Justice Stone tried to articulate constitu-
tional restraints on the spending power:
One restriction is that the purpose must be truly national. An-
other is that it may not be used to coerce action left to state con-
trol. Another is the conscience and patriotism of Congress and the
Executive. 1
45
But of these restraints, the first - "truly national" - and second
"left to state control" - seem hardly more clear or better-fitted to
judicial interpretation than the "conscience and patriotism" of the
third.
Still, it was Justice Stone and his fellow dissenters, and not the
Butler majority, who struggled to articulate constitutional limits
within the Hamiltonian view of the spending power. Justice Stone's
dissent in Butler is renowned most of all for its articulation of a "guid-
ing principle" of judicial review:
[W]hile unconstitutional exercise of power by the executive and
legislative branches of the government is subject to judicial re-
straint, the only check upon our own exercise of power is our sense
of self-restraint. 1
46
Beginning with the Court's refusal to invalidate Social Security in
1937, in spite of constitutional claims quite similar to those raised in
Butler, the Court quickly reduced the tenth amendment to "but a tru-
ism. "147 So it remained over the next forty years. After the flurry of
controversy about Court-packing, a plan specifically inspired by presi-
dential outrage over the Butler decision, Roosevelt's appointees to the
Court shared a perception that both life and federalism were messy,
without neat, logically ordered choices. The new majority and their
144. For valiant efforts to put teeth into the bite of rational relationship review, see Gunther, In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1972); Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law. Judicial Review and Democratic
Theory, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1049 (1979). For a similar approach to federalism concerns, see Kaden,
Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847 (1979). Kaden
limits his proposal to cases in which the spending power "would exceed the congressional power under
the commerce clause because of its interference with state autonomy," id. at 896, but in such a case,
Kaden argues, the burden should shift to Congress "to demonstrate that the [spending power] require-
ment is related to the achievement of an important governmental objective." Id. It is difficult to imag-
ine this proposed standard of judicial review in actual operation, just as it is hard to tell why what may
be a good idea as policy should be imposed as a judicial test allegedly premised on the Constitution. As
Justice Stone warned, quoting Holmes in his Butler dissent, "It must be remembered that legislators are
the ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts."
297 U.S. at 87 (quoting Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904)).
145. 297 U.S. at 87.
146. Id. at 78-79.
147. See supra note 4.
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immediate successors stressed the complexity of social and economic
relationships and therefore believed such matters were best left to leg-
islative processes.
This is not to say that all constitutional restraints on the spending
power are inconceivable. It is to suggest, however, that the constitu-
tional promised land for such limits is to be found somewhere other
than in mystical rings of federalism circling on or about the tenth
amendment. In a hypothetical example mentioned by the Butler ma-
jority, for example, Congress might mandate instruction in subversive
activities.'48 This illustration is exactly the kind of reductio ad ab-
surdum favored in the old, dual federalism style of legal argument.49
Even if the political system were to misfire so improbably as to require
that students be instructed in subversion, a Court should not strike
down such an absurdity on the basis of the spending power. It would
be far more persuasive to review such a law as a possible invasion of
academic freedom, for example, or as an infringement of other individ-
ual rights. 150
We can all imagine blatantly unconstitutional conditions imping-
ing upon the civil rights of individuals that could conceivably be tied
to federally-funded programs. Constitutional constraints on such con-
tingencies can be derived from specific constitutional protections
outside the spending power and the tenth amendment. It is quite im-
portant, in fact, to keep such constitutional review separate and dis-
tinct from efforts to squeeze states' rights limits from the Constitution.
Such limits ultimately must rely on what Justice Holmes once mocked
as an "invisible radiation from the tenth amendment."'15 1
It is possible, of course, to posit elegant theories of what such
radiations might usefully contain or what federalism would look like
148. 297 U.S. at 74. Justice Roberts also listed redistribution of the entire industrial population,
id. at 76, as well as such other in terrorem prospects as redistribution of income and the like.
149. In addition to the fine example provided by Butler itself, see, for example, Justice Suther-
land's majority opinion in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 278, 295-308 (1936). For recent discus-
sion of the lawyerly habit of using extreme hypotheticals, see Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L.
REv. 361 (1985).
150. See O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 CAL. L.
REV. 443 (1966). See also, e.g., Note, Taking Federalism Seriously: Limiting State Acceptance of Na-
tional Grants, 90 YALE L.J. 1694 (1981); Stolz, Revenue Sharing - New American Revolution or Trojan
Horse?, 58 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1973); Linde, Justice Douglas on Freedom in the Welfare State, 39 WASH.
L. REv. 4, 28-31 (1964). See generally Kriemer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative
Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PENN. L. REv. 1293 (1984).
151. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920). This explicit indication of Justice Holmes's
corrosive view of the tenth amendment, in the context of an alleged conflict between the tenth amend-
ment and national power in the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, seems a better source for his
interpretation of the tenth amendment than Professor Van Alstyne's attempt to reason by inference
from Justice Holmes's "dissenting dictum" in Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197,
202 (1904). See Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 1711 n. 11.
832 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
in the wisest, most just, or most efficient best-of-all-possible worlds.
Recent efforts to do so often are quite impressive. 15 2 But it is a logical
flaw, as well as an historical anomaly, to believe that it is possible
simultaneously to invest the tenth amendment's capacious language
with the power to emanate radiations or to cast penumbrae suitable
for judicial framing, while also maintaining that the ninth amendment
does no such thing. Indeed, the tenth amendment's text itself contem-
plates no greater judicial enforcement of federalism constraints than
enforcement of constraints premised on its reservation of power to the
people.1 53 Furthermore, the track record for judicial efforts on behalf
of states' rights is sufficiently appalling that it comes as no surprise
that advocates of the New Federalism - such as Justice Powell, Pro-
fessor Van Alstyne, and their allies - simply avoid talking about the
past practice of judically-enforced federalism limits on congressional
power.
IV. CONCLUSION
It may be noted that a pendulum never swings exactly the same
way twice. Even in a vacuum, because of the Earth's rotation, each
swing is slightly different. It is impossible to reproduce the historic
push exactly. If the laws of physics and the paths of pendulums are
uncertain and relative, surely the rule of law is in still greater flux.
That is partially because the favorite American indoor sport -
bemoaning the mistakes made by our various governments - is not
played terribly well in judicial chambers. It is also because the judicial
hunt for "lack of squarage"154 in matters of federalism is circular. It is
without any identifiable, sensible basis in history, the text of the Con-
stitution, or the development of constitutional law over nearly 200
years. Casey Stengel notwithstanding, one cannot simply "look it up."
Just as there are reasons for judges to avoid deciding who were
152. An illuminating attempt by Kathryn Abrams to reason about the tenth amendment from
the structure and relationship approach advocated by Professor Charles Black may be found in her
Note, On Reading and Using the Tenth Amendment, supra note 13. I find it ultimately unpersuasive,
however, as I do Robert Nagel's attempt to interweave various threads of concern for federalism values
in Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value, supra note 13, as well as the other sources cited in that
footnote. Two recent, sensitive arguments which draw upon visions of federalism of the type I favor
may be found in M. BALL, LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR, AND THEOLOGY 71-6 (1985)
(federalism boundaries in aid of community, functioning to designate responsibility rather than acquisi-
tion or sovereignty) and Yackle, supra note 28 at 1034-40 (federalism as safeguard for individual
rights). Significantly, neither makes a claim of constitutional enforceability for his view of federalism.
153. For a powerful and moving recent treatment of the possible constitutional meaning to be
derived from ideas associated with the power of the people, see Charles Black's Rubin Lecture, Further
Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood, delivered at the Columbia Law School, March
20, 1986.
154. A. Bickel, supra note 75, at 91.
[Vol. 57
1986] TRUISMS: TENTH AMENDMENT, SPENDING POWER 833
the greatest baseball players, 55 there are good and sufficient grounds
for them to shun the role of umpiring our national pastime of compar-
ing the relative demerits of our governments. In debating or playing
the politics of federalism, in Yogi Berra's immortal words: "It ain't
over 'til its over." We can always hope while we "Wait 'til next year."
Arguments about whether Congress invaded the proper sphere of the
states are like the old disputes about whether it was Mays, Mantle or
Snider who was obviously the best centerfielder - or whether DiMag-
gio, in his prime, was really the best of all. That debate helped sort out
one's friends. But appealing to an adult to settle the argument was
simply not acceptable. 56 Only somebody without full understanding
of the intricacies and joys of the game could believe that an appeal to
higher authority might resolve something so important.
155. The difficulty in naming the great baseball players was illustrated when Justice Blackmun
attempted to do just that in his majority opinion in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). The saga of
the efforts by other Justices and their clerks to amend Justice Blackmun's list, and Justice Blackmun's
profound regret for the omission of Mel Ott, is recounted in R. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE
BRETHREN 189-192 (1979). See also Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922); Cover,
Your Law-Baseball Quiz, N.Y. Times, April 5, 1979 at A-23, op. ed.
156. But see B. JAMES, HISTORICAL BASEBALL ABSTRACT 397 (1985) (Mantle best in prime;
Cobb best over career).

